INTRODUCTION

                                     SETTING THE STAGE


                         It  is with  loving pride  we drape  the
                         colors  in tribute  of  respect to  this
                         citizen  of  your great  republic.   And
                         here  and  now  in the  presence  of the
                         illustrious  dead we  pledge our  hearts
                         and  our honor in carrying this war to a
                         successful  issue.   Lafayette,  we  are
                         here.
                                                  -   Colonel   Charles  E.
                                                  Stanton  in  a  speech at
                                                  the  tomb   of  American-
                                                  Revolutionary War General
                                                  Marquis  de Lafayette,  4
                                                  July 1917.^1 


                         We've paid off that old fart, Lafayette.
                         What Frog son-of-a-bitch do we owe now?
                                                  - An American Infantryman
                                                  after   the   Battle   of
                                                  Soissons, 27 May 1918.^2 


                    "If  success  beckons,"  said  Theobald  von  Bethmann-
               Hollweg, "we must follow."^3    With this capitulation to  the
               nation's army and naval leaders on 9 January 1917, Germany's
               Chancellor accepted the resumption of unrestricted submarine
               _                    _

                    ^1 Jay M. Shafritz, _Words on War:  Military Quotations_
               _from Ancient Times to the Present_ (New York:  Prentice Hall,
               1990), 488.

                    ^2 Henry Berry, _Make the Kaiser Dance:  The American_
               _Experience in World War I_ (Garden City, NY:  Doubleday and
               Co., 1978), 153.

                    ^3 [German] Reichstag Committee of Inquiry, "Report of
               the Conference at Pless, January 9, 1917," in _Official_
               _German Documents Relating to the World War_, 2 vols. (New
               York:  Oxford University Press, 1923), 2:1320-21.

                                             1


               warfare.   The  Chancellor's peace  feelers  directed toward
               President  Woodrow  Wilson  in December  1916  had  met with
               little favorable response, and his influence with the Kaiser
               had eroded.^4   Although this  policy would surely pull the US
               into  the war, Germany's military leaders -- including Field
               Marshall Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff --
               felt  certain  that  America posed  little  threat;  a force
               across the Atlantic of only 110,000 soldiers which had  done
               little  more than  irritate the  Mexican  government in  its
               chase after  Pancho Villa  seemed hardly  a formidable  foe.
               America's navy, which had  only ten percent of  its manpower
               requirements  and only one third of  its vessels supplied to
               operational  standards,  also  caused  the  German  military
               little  concern.   While the  US had  committed itself  to a
               naval  building program in 1916, the resulting capital ships
               were  hardly   the   type  to   conduct  an   anti-submarine
               campaign.^5 
                    Germany's  military  had  more  respect  for  America's
               industrial  potential.  Perhaps most impressive, at least in
               terms of capacity for modern warfare,  was the production of
               iron  and steel.    As early  as  1899,  the output  of  the
               Carnegie  Steel Corporation  exceeded Great  Britain's total
               yearly production by 695,000 tons.   Formed on 4 March 1901,
               the  United States  Steel  Company  soon  became  the  first
               corporation in the world to  be capitalized for $1  billion.
               At the turn  of the century,  American steel production  was
               already ranked  first in  the  world, outdistancing  second-
               _                    _

                    ^4 Ernest R. May, _The World War and American Isolation,_
               _1914-1917_ (Chicago:  Quadrangle Books, 1959), 387-415.  May
               shows that Wilson's demand that all belligerents openly and
               explicitly state their war aims was unacceptable to Berlin. 
               Similarly, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George's newly
               formed War Cabinet strongly objected to the implication that
               Wilson publicly placed them on the same moral level as the
               Germans.  For the texts of the almost identical notes sent
               to the Entente and to the Central Powers, see _The Papers of_
               _Woodrow Wilson_, gen. ed. Arthur S. Link, 63 vols.
               (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1966 - ), 40:222-29
               (hereafter, _PWW_).

                    ^5 James L. Stokesbury, _A Short History of World War I_
               (New York:  William Morrow and Company, 1981), 216-20;
               Barbara Tuchman, _The Zimmermann Telegram_ (New York:  Delta
               Books, 1963), 132-42.  The classic critique of the Naval Act
               of 1916 can be found in Harold and Margaret Sprout, _The Rise_
               _of American Naval Power, 1776-1918_ (Princeton:  Princeton
               University Press, 1939).  For a more recent but equally
               biting treatment see Paulo E. Coletta, _Admiral Bradley A._
               _Fiske and the American Navy_ (Lawrence:  Regents Press of
               Kansas, 1979).

                                             2

                                                                          3

               place   Germany  by  thirty  percent.    In  addition,  iron
               production in the US had doubled between 1914 and 1917.^6 
                    In  spite  of  America's   impressive  output  of  such
               materials,  Germany's leaders  believed  that their  U-boats
               could starve Britain out of the war long before the US could
               adapt itself  to full-scale  mobilization.  Admiral  Henning
               von  Holtzendorf, Chief of the German Naval Staff, estimated
               that the  submarines would sink  600,000 tons per  month for
               six  months.   Fearful of  the  submarines, neutral  nations
               would cease shipping  to England altogether, causing  a loss
               of 1,200,000 of the 3,000,000 tons of neutral shipping.  The
               total loss for Great Britain would equal thirty-nine percent
               of its available  tonnage.  By the time the US could amass a
               substantial force, there would be  no bottoms left to  ferry
               it across the ocean.  Even if America could somehow find the
               required  shipping, the  Germans  felt confident  that  they
               would  control the  Channel ports  and  therefore offer  the
               Americans no place  to land an  expeditionary force.   While
               this choice  would doubtlessly add  to her list  of enemies,
               Germany's  military  minds  believed  that  it  would  yield
               victory.  They were wrong.^7 
                    Although it would number more  than four million by the
               time  of  the  Armistice, the  military  force  available to
               answer an  American call  to  arms in  April 1917  commanded
               little awe.   The aging  officer corps had no  experience in
               modern  war;  in their  education  they  had looked  to  the
               outdated models of mobility and maneuver from American Civil
               War battles instead of the more relevant Russo-Japanese War,
               which had  demonstrated the  destructive capacity  of modern
               firepower.^8   Both the Chief  of Staff, Major General Hugh L.
               _                    _

                    ^6 John M. Cooper, Jr., _Pivotal Decades:  The United_
               _States, 1900-1920_ (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1990), 11; Clark
               C. Spence, _The Sinews of American Capitalism:  American_
               _Economic History_ (New York:  Hill & Wang, 1964), 244.

                    ^7 Holger H. Herwig and David F. Trask, "The Failure of
               Germany's Undersea Offensive Against World Shipping,
               February 1917 - October 1918," _The Historian_ 33 (August
               1971):  612-13; Trevor Wilson, _The Myriad Faces of War: _
               _Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918_ (Cambridge, UK:  Polity
               Press, 1986), 427-28.

                    ^8 Harry P. Ball, _Of Responsible Command:  A History of_
               _the U.S. Army War College_ (Carlisle Barracks, PA:  U.S. Army
               War College, 1983), 141-2.  There is some controversy,
               however, about whether the American World War I commanders'
               education was as useless as it might seem.  Edward Coffman
               argues that the professional training that these leaders
               received was a significant improvement over the nineteenth
                                                             (continued...)

                                                                          4

               Scott, and  his Assistant,  Major General  Tasker H.  Bliss,
               were within a year of mandatory retirement.  The size of the
               army had  fluctuated  from  a high  of  210,000  during  the
               Spanish-American War to  a low of 64,000 in  1907 -- roughly
               equal to the  number of British casualties on  the first day
               of the Somme.   By 1 April 1917 it was  able to muster 5,791
               officers and 121,797  enlisted men.  No division  or unit of
               comparable   size   existed   which  could   serve   as   an
               expeditionary  force, and  from  the  entire  army  the  War
               Department could  immediately organize and ship  only 24,000
               troops and  provide enough ammunition  for only a day  and a
               half of  heavy fighting.   The  National Guard consisted  of
               181,620 officers  and men, of  whom 80,446 had  already been
               called to federal  service.  Moreover, these  poorly trained
               Guardsmen  lacked   a  unified   and  centralized   command.
               Essential  supplies of  a modern  army, such as  poison gas,
               flame-throwers, tanks,  mortars, grenades, heavy  field guns
               and  modern  aircraft,  were  non-existent,  and  the  field
               artillery had sufficient rounds to sustain a bombardment for
               no more than a few minutes.  The US Army ranked  seventeenth
               in  the world,  keeping company  with  Denmark, Holland  and
               Chile.  Historian Robert H.  Ferrell has labelled it "a home
               for  old soldiers, a  quiet, sleepy place  where they killed
               time until they began drawing their pensions."^9 
                    The task of molding the diminutive American army into a
               fighting force and of developing  the strategic plans for US
               participation  fell upon the shoulders of the War Department
               _                    _

                    ^8 (...continued)
               century volunteer ideal and that it both adequately exposed
               these commanders to German tactical theory and trained them
               to lead in combat.  The opportunity to prove the
               respectability of the AEF and its commanders in a major
               campaign against the Germans in 1919 was preempted. 
               Coffman, "The AEF Leaders' Education for War," in _The Great_
               _War, 1914-18:  Essays on the Military, Political, and Social_
               _History of the First World War_, ed. R.J.Q. Adams (College
               Station:  Texas A&M University Press, 1990):  139-59.  See
               also Joseph G. Dawson's comments on Coffman's article,
               ibid., 183-90.

                    ^9 Robert H. Ferrell, _Woodrow Wilson and World War I,_
               _1917-1921_, The New American Nation Series, ed. Henry Steele
               Commager and Richard B. Morris (New York:  Harper and Row,
               1985), 14-15; Marvin A. Kreidberg and Morton G. Henry,
               _History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army,_
               _1775-1945_ (Washington:  Department of the Army, 1955), 216;
               US Army War College, Historical Section, _The Genesis of the_
               _American First Army_ (Washington:  Government Printing
               Office, 1938 [1929]), 1-3; Stokesbury, _A Short History of_
               _World War I_, 218-19.

                                                                          5

               General Staff.  In April 1917 this immature body of military
               advisors consisted  of fifty-one officers,  only nineteen of
               whom  were on  duty in Washington.   None  of these  men had
               commanded in  action or had  even seen a modern  division of
               American soldiers.   Of these nineteen, eight  were occupied
               with routine business, leaving only eleven -- comprising the
               War College  Division, housed with  the Army War  College at
               Washington  Barracks, away  from the  remainder  of the  War
               Department on the other side of the capital city -- free  to
               concentrate on the herculean task of creating from  thin air
               a viable war plan against Germany.  Contrasted with the huge
               British, French and German General Staffs at the outbreak of
               the  war in 1914  -- 232, 644  and 650  respectively -- this
               number was  absurdly small  but indicative  of the  distant,
               sometimes forcibly detached position  from which America had
               viewed the struggle on the Continent.^10 
                    Inefficient routines also hamstrung the General Staff's
               effectiveness.  The serpentine paper trail required of every
               report  wound almost  all  through the  War  Department.   A
               proposal by  the head of a bureau, such  as the Chief of the
               Ordnance Department, would go first to the Adjutant General,
               who forwarded it  to the War College, where  it was assigned
               to one  of  the overworked  committees  of the  War  College
               Division.  After  these officers reached a  conclusion, they
               presented it  to the Division  Chief for his approval.   The
               paper   was  then  returned  to  the  Adjutant  General  who
               forwarded it to  the Chief of  Staff.  If  the issue was  of
               grave importance,  the Chief of  Staff would send it  to the
               Secretary of War.  After the Chief of Staff or the Secretary
               of War  had approved  the proposal, it  was returned  to the
               Adjutant General and  then finally to the  office of origin.
               Mountains of  papers backed up in this system.  The Chief of
               Staff  would have  had to spend  eight hours  and forty-five
               minutes of each day reading memoranda if he were to devote a


               _                    _

                    ^10 James Hewes, "The United States Army General Staff,
               1900-1917," _Military Affairs_ 38 (April 1974):  68; "Report
               of the Chief of Staff," in  _War Department Annual Report,_
               _1919_, 4 vols. (Washington:  Government Printing Office,
               1920), 1:248-49; Frederic L. Paxson, "The American War
               Government, 1917-1918," _American Historical Review_ 26
               (October 1920):  54.  See also Edward M. Coffman, _The War to_
               _End All Wars:  The American Military Experience in World War_
               _I_ (Madison:  University of Wisconsin Press, 1986 [New York: 
               Oxford, 1968]), 21-4; Marvin A. Kreidberg and Morton G.
               Henry, _History of Military Mobilization in the United States_
               _Army_, 215-16; James Hewes, _From Root to McNamara:  Army_
               _Organization and Administration, 1900-1963_ (Washington: 
               Center of Military History, 1975).

                                                                          6

               mere   three  minutes  to  each  paper  passing  across  his
               desk.^11 
                    An examination of  the role of the War College Division
               in  the  formation of  military  strategy  for World  War  I
               reveals  two major threads  in American preparation  for the
               conflict.  First,  the United States found  itself unmindful
               of and  ill-prepared for the degree of involvement which its
               declaration of war in April 1917 would require.  Neither the
               military planners  nor the political  leaders had adequately
               addressed the  possibility of  US participation  in the  war
               that had  been  raging in  Europe  for almost  three  years.
               Fundamental strategic questions  such as whether to  send an
               army to  Europe, and if  so when and  where to deploy  it to
               support national goals, remained unanswered until  after the
               Congress of the United States granted Wilson's request for a
               declaration of war on Germany.
                    The second major recognizable theme within the plans is
               the   distinction  between  the  approach  of  the  military
               planners and that of the political leaders.   Throughout the
               period  of preparation  for  US  involvement,  the  military
               leaders  held a  singular  goal  foremost  --  victory  over
               Imperial Germany.  Many political leaders, especially Wilson
               himself,  had other concerns  which often  put them  at odds
               with the military  recommendations at those rare  times when
               they  even knew  of them.   The  desperate situation  at sea
               demanded  that the US cooperate closely with Great Britain's
               Royal  Navy,  so Wilson's  only  flexibility lay  in  how he
               employed  the  nation's  land  forces.^12      The  occasional
               harmony  which sometimes  existed between  the military  and
               political  objectives, however,  can  be attributed  more to
               coincidence than to cohesive planning.       Historians
               Arthur S. Link and John Whiteclay Chambers,  II, have argued
               that "Wilson's control and  execution of military-diplomatic
               policy was  personal and direct," and that he "insisted upon
               maintaining  daily  oversight  of  all  military  and  naval
               operations,  even  down  to particular  strategies."    They
               contend  that   the  President  enjoyed   a  close   working
               relationship with  his military  advisers and  that "in  all
               matters of military-diplomatic  policies and strategies,  he
               required that there  be a direct flow  of information coming
               to the President."  They  further claim that "through  daily
               meetings  with Secretary  [of  War  Newton  D.]  Baker,  and
               _                    _

                    ^11 Edward M. Coffman, "The Battle Against Red Tape: 
               Business Methods of the War Department General Staff, 1917-
               1918," _Military Affairs_ 26 (Spring 1962):  1-3.

                    ^12 David F. Trask, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I, " in
               _American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century_, ed. Warren F.
               Kimball, The Forum Series in American History (St. Louis,
               MO:  Forum Press, 1980):  7-8.

                                                                          7

               members of  the General  Staff as  necessary, the  President
               maintained  personal  control  of  the  activities  of   the
               military establishment,  especially as  they related  to his
               larger    goals."^13        Wilson    fully   exercised    his
               constitutional powers  as Commander-in-Chief  and maintained
               strict   control   of  final   military   policy  decisions,
               especially those relating to  naval policy.  The picture  of
               close   cooperation  painted   by  Link   and  Chambers   is
               inaccurate, however, during the formative period of American
               military planning  for  the  war.   An  examination  of  the
               policy-making  process  illustrates   that  a  gulf  existed
               between the approach of the military planners in the General
               Staff and that of the  President himself, especially as such
               planning related to the Continental Army  Reserve, strategic
               planning  on the eve of  the war, the  decision to raise the
               army's manpower  through conscription, the  decision to send
               an  immediate expeditionary force to France, the decision to
               follow-up with  more soldiers  as rapidly  as possible,  and
               finally  the decision to exercise American military power on
               the Western Front.
                    Woodrow Wilson fought  heartily to keep  the US out  of
               World  War I.   Although  his sentiments  leaned toward  the
               Allies in  their struggle  with the  Central Powers,  Wilson
               sought Congressional  approval for war with  much reluctance
               and only after he believed  he had exhausted all attempts at
               peace and neutrality.  Nevertheless, as gradual as America's
               entry into the Great War was,  the strategic preparation for
               it still lagged behind.

















               _                    _

                    ^13 Arthur S. Link and John W. Chambers, II, "Woodrow
               Wilson as Commander-in-Chief," in _The United States Military_
               _Under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989_, ed.
               Richard H. Kohn (New York:  New York University Press,
               1991), 319-24.