CONCLUSION


                    With the decision to concentrate American forces on the
               Western  Front  finalized,   the  responsibility  for   most
               strategic planning  shifted away from Washington.   Finally,
               more than seven months after  the US declaration of war, the
               foundation of the American war effort was complete:  the AEF
               would  be raised  by conscription;  it would  be shipped  as
               rapidly as  possible to  Europe, receiving  its training  on
               both sides  of the Atlantic; and it  would cooperate closely
               with the French and British in the West, but would remain an
               independent  force.  The  amalgamation issue would  rear its
               head  again in  the winter  of  1917-18, but  the burden  of
               parrying  the   Allied  attempts  to   incorporate  American
               soldiers  would fall  on  General  Pershing,  as  would  the
               decision to focus  US efforts on the Lorraine  sector of the
               Western  Front.  Further issues relating to the coordination
               of the Entente war effort would be debated among the members
               of  the Supreme  War Council.    While Bliss,  who had  been
               active in the General Staff's strategic planning as both the
               Chief of  the War College  Division and the Chief  of Staff,
               would serve as  the American military representative  on the
               Council, the War  College Division itself would  play little
               part  in  these  considerations.   Belatedly,  the  military
               planners  in  the  General Staff  had  fulfilled  their war-
               planning role.  The task  of carrying through on those plans
               would belong to General Pershing  and his own staff at their
               Headquarters in France.^1 
               _                    _

                    ^1 See Allan  R. Millet,  "Over Where?   The AEF  and the
               American Strategy  for Victory, 1917-1918,"  in _Against  All_
               _Enemies:  Interpretations of  American Military History from_
               _Colonial Times  to the  Present_, eds.  Kenneth J. Hagan  and
               William Roberts, Contributions  in Military Studies 51  (New
               York:   Greenwood  Press, 1986):    235-56; American  Battle
               Monuments Commission,  _American Armies  and Battlefields  in_
               _Europe:   A History,  Guide and Reference  Book_ (Washington:
               Government  Printing Office,  1938),  16; Trask,  _The United_
               _States in the Supreme  War Council_; On 3  September Pershing
               ordered from his own staff a study of strategical fronts for
               the employment  of the  AEF.  The  examination was  complete
               within the  month:  Lt.  Col. Fox Conner, Col.  L.R. Eltinge
               and Maj. H.A.  Drum, "A Strategical Study  on the Employment
                                                             (continued...)

                                             1
                                                                          2

                    After  Major  General  Peyton   C.  March  assumed  the
               position  of Chief  of  Staff  in the  spring  of 1918,  the
               General  Staff   would  finally  gain  recognition   as  the
               coordinating  and supervisory agent of the War Department --
               the  status  which it  had  sought  since  the turn  of  the
               century.  Under  March, the War  College Division's role  in
               strategic policy-making  would  be made  official  and  that
               branch of the  General Staff would be renamed  the War Plans
               Division.   Also during  March's tenure, Wilson  would begin
               close coordination with his  military planners, as described
               by historians Link  and Chambers.  Such a  cohesive approach
               to planning, however,  had not existed during  the formative
               period  of America's  policy-making for  the  war, and  this
               examination of  that  topic has  demonstrated the  disparity
               between the approach  and attitude of the  military planners
               in the War College Division and that of President Wilson.^2 
                    Military  planning before the US declaration of war had
               found itself tethered by  several strong ropes.   Within the
               War Department itself there existed no consensus on how best
               to   approach  the  task.    The  individual  bureau  chiefs
               vigilantly protected their  personal power from any  hint of
               infringement,  and   in  so  doing  often   exercised  their
               influence  in  Congress  to  thwart  the  General  Staff  by
               reducing  its number or limiting its authority.  Legislative
               opposition  stemmed from other sources as well, including an
               honest  fear  that  any  comprehensive  policy-making  would
               inevitably lead  to a  Prussian-like military system  within
               the United  States.  In  addition, the organized  militia --
               the  traditional  American  second line  of  defense  -- had
               strong supporters in key positions in Congress.  The General
               Staff's  criticisms of the  National Guard would  thus yield
               only   a  backlash  of  attacks  on  the  military  planners
               themselves.

               _                    _

                    ^1 (...continued)
               of  the A.E.F. Against  the Imperial German  Government," 25
               September  1917,  Record Group  120  (American Expeditionary
               Forces), File 1003, Folder 681, Part 2, G-3, G.H.Q., A.E.F.,
               National Archives;  Pershing's headquarters  were at No.  31
               Rue  Constantine, Paris, until  1 September 1917,  when they
               were  moved  to  Chaumont.    Army  War  College  Historical
               Section, _Genesis of the American First Army_, 3.

                    ^2 Edward M. Coffman, _The Hilt  of the Sword:  The Career_
               _of Peyton C. March_ (Madison:  University of Wisconsin Press,
               1966); Michael J.  McCarthy, "The US War  Department General
               Staff in World War I," in  _The Encyclopedia of World War  I_,
               ed. Anne Cipriano Venzon, Wars  of the United States  Series
               (New  York:    Garland  Publishing,  forthcoming);  Link and
               Chambers, "Woodrow Wilson as Commander-in-Chief," 319-24.
                                                                          3

                    The military planners were by no means blameless.  They
               did little  to transcend  the myopic context  of the  Monroe
               Doctrine even as American foreign policy was reaching across
               the  oceans.    Even  if they  had  been  more  far-sighted,
               however,  the strong public sentiment for neutrality and the
               understandably  popular desire  to  remain  aloof  from  the
               slaughter  in  Europe  would  have  prevented  any  military
               planning  which  might  have   even  remotely  suggested  US
               involvement.   In the  context of  American neutrality,  any
               military planning at all was seen by many as a prelude to an
               American role  in  the conflict,  and  therefore was  to  be
               avoided.
                    Woodrow   Wilson's   view  of   the   civilian-military
               relationship  cannot be discounted,  especially since he was
               the President who "kept us  out of war."  The constitutional
               distinction between the civilian Commander-in-Chief and  the
               military  leaders which Wilson  so greatly enforced  must be
               praised.  It was precisely the lack  of such a separation of
               powers which had  led Germany to make several  key errors in
               their  war effort, including the eventually fatal mistake of
               resuming  unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917.  A
               division of  civilian and military authority,  however, need
               not  yield  a  complete  rift  in  military   planning.    A
               coordinated  approach to policy-making can be pursued in the
               context of  civilian  authority,  but  Wilson  chose  almost
               completely to ignore  his General Staff.  He  did not simply
               overrule their suggestions; instead,  he seldom even  sought
               their advice.^3 
                    As  winter passed into  spring in 1917,  it became more
               and  more obvious  that the  US was  drifting into  the war.
               Even  Wilson  began to  consider  the  steps that  might  be
               necessary to mobilize America's armed forces, but only those
               actions  necessary to safeguard the homeland from a possible
               attack.    Definite  restrictions remained  in  place.   The
               President tenaciously clung  to the hope that  Germany would
               not carry through  on its  U-boat threat  and that  American
               involvement could  be averted.   Consequently, the  military
               planning which Wilson did sanction -- narrow though it was -
               - was  kept under  tight wraps.   Chief  of Staff  Scott was
               reluctant  to  operate  solely  within these  confines  and,
               unknown to the  President, ordered the military  planners in
               the War College  Division to consider strategies  which went
               significantly beyond  those which  Wilson desired  and which
               included the possibility of creating an expeditionary force.
               _                    _

                    ^3 Martin Kitchen,  "Civil-Military Relations  in Germany
               During  the First  World War,"  in _The  Great  War, 1914-18:_
               _Essays on the Military, Political, and Social History of the_
               _First World War_, ed. R.J.Q.  Adams (College Station:   Texas
               A&M  University   Press),  39-68;  Cooper,   "World  War  I:
               European Origins and American Intervention," 10-12.
                                                                          4

               Even though these  military planners had finally  broken the
               bonds of the Monroe Doctrine, they found themselves hampered
               by the  nation's previous  inaction and  failed to create  a
               reasonable plan for US involvement.
                    The  War College  Division  did, however,  successfully
               draft plans  for raising  a mass army.   It  concluded early
               that  conscription would  be  the  only  feasible  means  of
               raising a large American force,  no matter what the eventual
               shape of the nation's involvement.   Here again, though, the
               gap between the concerns of the military planners  and those
               of the President  is illustrated.  In spite  of the repeated
               urgings of  the General  Staff and in  spite of  the growing
               likelihood  of US  participation  in  the  struggle,  Wilson
               continued to  look toward  voluntarism to  expand the  army.
               Not  until he realized  that selective service  could thwart
               Theodore Roosevelt's plans to raise a volunteer division for
               service overseas did  he embrace the draft  and jettison his
               previous affinity for volunteers.   This was one of the rare
               times that  Wilson was  fully aware of  the opinions  of the
               General  Staff.  His concurrence would not result from their
               persuasive  arguments, however; instead,  it would come only
               after he had realized the political utility of conscription.
                    Wilson was  not  so fully  attuned to  the War  College
               Division's   recommendations    concerning   an    immediate
               expeditionary force to France.  The military planners voiced
               their reservations passionately  and argued that sending  an
               American army to Europe before it had been trained could not
               only threaten the nation's independent war effort, but might
               also result  in a mass  butchering of raw soldiers.   Wilson
               was probably ignorant  of these opinions when, on  2 May, he
               promised Joffre that the US  would raise and send a division
               as soon as one could be organized.  In retrospect, following
               the  War College  Division's  advice  to  hold the  bulk  of
               American  soldiers  within  the   country  until  they   had
               completed their  training would  no doubt  have left  the US
               lacking a land presence at the end of the war or, worse yet,
               might have  resulted in a  victory for  the Central  Powers.
               Such  hindsight analysis does not erase the fact that Wilson
               had not  thought  to  consult the  General  Staff  and  that
               Secretary of War  Baker proved a poor messenger  for the War
               College Division's opinions.
                    Wilson's   approach   to    strategic   planning   came
               dangerously  close to  folly when  he suggested that  the US
               seek an alternative to the Western Front.  Wilson seemed too
               easily  swayed  by  the  strategic  advise  of  amateurs  or
               polemicists,  such  as  Herbert H.  Sargeant.    Indeed, the
               President  appeared  reluctant  to  accept   even  the  most
               straight-forward arguments which excluded the possibility of
               an attack  through Russia.   Secretary of  War Baker  had to
               present  the   War  College   Division  critique   of  these
               alternatives twice, and even then it is less likely that the
               President was swayed by the strategic considerations than it
                                                                          5

               is  that he  was influenced  by the  fall of  the Provincial
               Government  in Russia  and  by  Baker's  contention  that  a
               campaign  along  any  front  but  the  West  would  threaten
               Wilson's role at the peace settlement.
                    It is often  easy to find mistakes  in failure.   It is
               more   difficult   to   criticize  a   process   which  ends
               successfully, as did America's effort during the First World
               War.  The Allied victory,  however, does not change the fact
               that American strategy  was formulated in a  tardy, reckless
               and  haphazard  fashion,  with Wilson  making  policies  and
               commitments with  no consideration  for the  counsel of  his
               military planners in the War College Division of the General
               Staff.  This is not to say that the advice of those planners
               was always  sound, or  to claim that  it should  always have
               been  adopted, or  even to  suggest  that, at  least on  the
               surface,  American  diplomatic  goals  and  military  policy
               failed  to mesh.   In  fact, in  retrospect it  appears that
               Wilson's decisions were often better suited to America's war
               aims than  was  the  advice  of the  War  College  Division.
               Nonetheless  it must be recognized that these decisions were
               not the result of a long and considered dialogue between the
               President  and these military  planners.  They  were instead
               the  outcome of  unilateral decision-making  which, although
               successful  in this  instance, is  a  dangerous approach  to
               strategic planning.