V

                         OVER WHERE?  THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES

                        TO THE WESTERN FRONT, JULY - NOVEMBER 1917


                    The decision to send an immediate expeditionary force
               to France did not complete American strategic planning. 
               While the United States had committed itself to a military
               role, the exact nature of the nation's involvement still
               remained to be determined.  Of immediate concern was the
               speed with which American troops would follow the First
               Division across the Atlantic:  would the bulk of the
               American army remain in North America to complete its
               training or would the United States begin shipping more
               soldiers immediately?  In addition, during the few months
               after the initial expeditionary force was dispatched to
               France, some prominent Americans -- even Wilson himself --
               questioned the wisdom of fighting on the Western Front. 
               Almost three years of relentless fighting there had left the
               terrain scarred with trenches and graves, yet had yielded
               little gain for either side.  An alternative to this
               stalemate was sought.
                    Pershing's appointment as Commanding General of the AEF
               marked the beginning of a shift in strategic planning
               initiative away from Washington.  Pershing's powers were
               vast and unprecedented -- never before had a commander
               wielded such _carte blanche_ control.  The only strict
               guideline which Wilson and Baker had offered was that the US
               must create an independent army, but surely the President
               was preaching to the converted.  Pershing staunchly demanded
               an independent force, much to the consternation of the
               Allies, and there is no indication that in the absence of
               this Presidential dictum Pershing would have completely
               subjugated his own command to that of the British and
               French.  Pershing desired to fulfill his role as Commanding
               General; exactly what he would command, however, remained
               unclear as the _Baltic_ sailed out of New York Harbor on 28
               May 1917.
                    Even after deciding to send the First Division to
               France, Wilson made no immediate commitment to follow-up
               with more soldiers.  On 17 May Colonel House forwarded a
               letter from George G. Moore, a retired New York businessman
               who had often visited Sir John French at the Headquarters of
               the British Expeditionary Forces in France during 1914-15. 

                                             1
                                                                          2

               These visits evidently were not wasted, since Moore astutely
               observed that "modern artillery gives overwhelming
               superiority to the army on the defensive and three years of
               warfare have shown the impossibility of an offensive
               succeeding against an army possessed of artillery and
               machine-guns adequately manned.  For this reason Ypres,
               Verdun, the Somme and the Dardenelles were German and
               British failures."  Moore echoed the General Staff's
               reservations when he concluded that the US should withhold
               the bulk of its army until a later date when a significant
               effect could be produced.  Impulsively committing more
               troops to Europe might result in the senseless slaughter of
               American soldiers, since "political urgency and the personal
               ambition of commanders have caused a hideous wastage of the
               man-power of England and France in attacks from which there
               was no intelligent hope of success."  Moore finally warned
               that the US should "avoid the needless wastage of American
               lives until the time when the sacrifice is warranted.  I
               have seen the steady dissipation of the man-power of England
               without any intelligent plan and pray that this may not
               happen here."^1 
                    Moore's appeal struck the President.  Wilson forwarded
               the note to Baker the next day, writing that "[the letter
               from] George G. Moore about defensive and offensive warfare
               on the Western Front of Europe makes a considerable
               impression on me and I should very much like to discuss it
               with you when we have the next opportunity."  Apparently
               unknown to Wilson, however, was that the military planners
               within America's War Department General Staff had already
               voiced these very warnings.  When Baker briefed the
               President on 8 May concerning the state of plans for the
               immediate expeditionary force to France, he was less than
               forthright about the War College Division's opinions.  Baker
               wrote:
                         My military associates here believe that it will
                         be necessary to have a division of troops on this
                         side ready to follow fairly shortly, so as to get
                         the advantage of the training received by the
                         first division and be able to supplement it should
                         battle loses or sickness diminish its numbers.^2 

               Baker did not lie about the General Staff's views concerning 
               the dispatch of a second division to France, but he was not
               completely open about all that the military planners had to
               say.  Included here were none of the misgivings which the
               _                    _

                    ^1 Moore to House, 17 May 1917, House to Wilson, 22 May
               1917, _PWW_, 42:372-74.

                    ^2 Wilson to Baker, 23 May 1917, ibid., 42:377; Baker to
               Wilson, 8 May 1917, Box 4, Document 123, Baker Papers, LOC.
                                                                          3

               War College Division had previously expressed and which they
               would reiterate only two days later in a memorandum to the
               Chief of Staff.  Absent too was the forceful dissent of
               Colonel W.H. Johnston who believed that his colleagues had
               not voiced their opposition to the expeditionary force
               strongly enough.  The General Staff had not changed its
               opinions by the time Baker briefed the President.  Wilson,
               then, seems to have been largely ignorant of the counsel of
               the military planners in the War College Division except as
               it was filtered through his Secretary of War.  Add to this
               the immediate and unyielding demands for a larger and larger
               contingent which Pershing would issue even before his boots
               touched French soil, and Wilson's decision to send even more
               troops to France immediately is understandable.^3 
                    While the _Baltic_ steamed across the Atlantic, Pershing
               and his staff began to formulate their strategy for the
               American role in the war.  This planning seemed to develop a
               life of its own as it grew farther and farther beyond what
               the military had expected.  G. Eugene Heller, a quarter-
               master's clerk remarked, "The A.E.F. developed like a
               snowball started from a mountaintop.  It was small and it
               grew far beyond anyone's expectations."  The whole exercise
               carried these planners into strategically uncharted waters. 
               Major James G. Harbord, Pershing's Chief of Staff, remarked: 
               "Our war ideas are expanding as we near the theater. 
               Officers whose lives have been spent trying to avoid
               spending fifteen cents of Government money now confront the
               necessity of expending fifteen millions of dollars, -- and
               on their intellectual and professional expansion depends
               their avoidance of the scrap heap."^4 
                    Pershing made tentative plans to have an army of at
               least 1,000,000 men by early spring of the following year. 
               To achieve this end, the United States would have to ship
               the equivalent of four divisions per month for the next
               year.  In addition, the supplies for such a force would call
               for the daily delivery to France of 25,000 tons of freight. 
               At the time, however, the most optimistic War Department
               estimates concluded that by the middle of June 1918 a total




               _                    _

                    ^3 Kuhn to the Chief of Staff, 10 May 1917, Subj:  Plans
               for a possible expeditionary force to France, RG 165/10050-
               8, NA.  See Chapter 4, above; W.H. Johnston, Memorandum of
               dissent, 11 May 1917, RG 165/10050-8.

                    ^4 Ruth Reynolds, "First To Go Over There," _Sunday News_
               (New York), 26 May 1940, 50; James G. Harbord, _Leaves from a_
               _War Diary_ (New York:  1925), 12.
                                                                          4

               of 634,975 American troops -- less than 65% of Pershing's
               request -- could be landed in France.^5 
                    Pershing did not stop at this initial request.  Only a
               few days later, on 11 July, he wrote to Washington that even
               more soldiers would be desirable.  He viewed his plan for
               1,000,000 troops as only a "basis of study" which "should
               not be construed as representing the maximum force which
               will be needed in France."  He suggested that "plans for the
               future should be based . . . on three times this force --
               i.e., at least 3,000,000 men," a rather surreal figure which
               would have left the US with a force larger than the combined
               strength of all the belligerents in Europe.^6 
                    By the time Pershing began to issue his growing demands
               for manpower, the military planners in the General Staff
               seem to have yielded to Baker's wishes for the immediate
               shipment of more soldiers to France.  On 7 June the War
               College Division issued a "program for the progressive
               dispatch of troops to France," in which the army would grow
               to more than 1,000,000 in the next four months and 120,000
               troops per month would cross the Atlantic beginning on 1
               August 1917.  This force would receive its training both in
               North America and in Europe.^7 
                    Baker worried that Wilson's admiration for George G.
               Moore's suggestions that the US retain most of its army
               might undermine the plan to send more soldiers immediately. 
               He wrote to the President on 27 May:
                         For us to sit by and allow the French and British
                         to be worn down by further attrition would start
                         three kinds of criticism; first, it would be said
                         that our part in the war was too slow, and that
                         the red tape of the General Staff was prevailing
                         over the impetuous wish of Americans to be of
                         present assistance, and this would be based upon
                         statements made by the British and French, and
               _                    _

                    ^5 Pershing, Paris, to Bliss, 2 July 1917, The Papers of
               John J. Pershing, Box 26, Library of Congress Manuscript
               Division (hereafter, Pershing Papers, LOC); Pershing, _My_
               _Experiences in the World War_, 1:94-5, 118; Smythe, "Pershing
               Goes 'Over There'," 268; Smythe, _Pershing:  General of the_
               _Armies_, 35; _The United States Army in the World War_, 2:17;
               Edward M. Coffman, "Conflicts in American Planning:  An
               Aspect of World War I Strategy," _Military Review_ 43 (June
               1963):  79.

                    ^6 Pershing, _My Experiences in the World War_, 1:101.

                    ^7 Kuhn to Bliss, 7 June 1917, Subj:  Tactical
               reorganization required to meet requirements in the European
               theatre of war and program for the progressive dispatch of
               troops to France, RG 165/10050-30, NA.
                                                                          5

                         also by soldiers in our own Army to the effect
                         that a long drawn out period of training in this
                         country is unnecessary.  Second, it would be said
                         that we were running the chance of the French or
                         Russians breaking down and thus immeasurably
                         increasing the size of our own task later.  Third,
                         it would be said that the immediate and
                         overwhelming aggregation of forces, including our
                         own, is the way most speedily to terminate the war
                         and not to feed nations to the German machine in
                         detail.^8 

               The Secretary of War enclosed a letter from Bliss in which
               the Chief of Staff praised Moore's thinking.  In spite of
               Bliss's appeal, however, Baker had touched a nerve with the
               President:  America's tardiness threatened not only
               continued slaughter on the battlefields but also the
               nation's perceived role in the fighting and thereby might
               thwart the President's own place at the settlement.
                    Wilson made his decision in the few days following
               Baker's letter.  Against the counsel of the General Staff,
               he accepted the advice of his Secretary of War.  Vilifying
               the "military masters of Germany . . . [whose] plan was to
               throw a broad belt of German military power and political
               control across the very center of Europe and beyond the
               Mediterranean into the heart of Asia," the President
               declared in a Flag Day Address on 14 June that "we are about
               to bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it may be millions,
               of our men, the young, the strong, the capable men of the
               nation, to go forth and die beneath [the flag] on fields of
               blood far away. . . ."  The die was cast and, albeit slowly,
               American troops began a steadily increasing flow to
               Europe.^9 
                    Still other questions came to the forefront of
               strategic consideration in the following months. 
               Suggestions from a variety of sources, including military
               men, politicians, journalists and even the President
               himself, offered alternatives to the Western Front as the
               focus of America's military efforts.  All of these proposals
               must have frustrated the planners in the War College
               Division, who seem to have settled on the Western Front even
               before they began to draft plans for the progressive
               dispatch of American soldiers to France.  Baker himself
               recalled years after the war that "General Pershing, General
               Scott, General Bliss and I had agreed that the war would
               _                    _

                    ^8 Baker to Wilson, 27 May 1917, Box 4, Document 160,
               Baker Papers, LOC.

                    ^9 Wilson, "A Flag Day Address," 14 June 1917, _PWW_,
               42:498-504.
                                                                          6

               have to be won on the western front at the time General
               Pershing started overseas.  At one of our conferences before
               he left we discussed some of the sideshows and decided that
               they were all useless. . . ."  In spite of the sound,
               strategic rationale for this decision, the General Staff
               would be forced to explain its reasoning repeatedly
               throughout the remainder of the year.^10 
                    The earliest alternatives to the Western Front had been
               offered before America even became involved in the war. 
               When the War College Division first began to examine
               strategic options in early February 1917, then Chief of
               Staff Scott recommended that they consider the possibility
               of Holland becoming involved in the conflict as a result of
               German U-boat attacks on her shipping.  An offensive through
               Holland, Scott argued, would allow an invasion into France
               to the rear of the western German army.^11 
                    The War College Division's eleven-page evaluation,
               written by Major E.T. Collins of the US Infantry, gave
               Scott's idea of a Holland front mixed reviews.  Since an
               American expeditionary force sent to Holland would arrive in
               friendly territory, an amphibious assault would be
               unnecessary.  Holland's harbors could be used, and Rotterdam
               could serve as an adequate port facility for an
               expeditionary force.  Nonetheless, any American offensive
               launched from within that country faced severe obstacles. 
               If Holland's army could not hold the line in the face of a
               German attack, the Dutch would have to resort to flooding
               their territory for defense, rendering an expeditionary
               force effectively secure, but bottled up and unable to
               advance.^12 
                    Estimates of the required strength of an American force
               sent to Holland were pessimistic at best.  The proposed
               force would have to be strong enough to either advance
               against and successfully attack the western German army or
               at least to cause its  withdrawal.  The most reliable
               _                    _

                    ^10 Baker to Peyton C. March, 7 September 1927, Box 150,
               Baker Papers, LOC, quoted in Edward M. Coffman, "The
               American Military and Strategic Policy in World War I," 75;
               Kuhn to Bliss, 7 June 1917, Subj:  Tactical reorganization
               required to meet requirements in the European theatre of war
               and program for the progressive dispatch of troops to
               France, RG 165/10050-30, NA; Beaver, _Newton D. Baker and the_
               _American War Effort_, 46-9; Nenninger, "American Military
               Effectiveness in the First World War," 124.

                    ^11 Chief of Staff Scott to Kuhn, 3 February 1917, RG
               165/9433-6, NA.

                    ^12 This and the following four paragraphs come from: 
               Kuhn to Scott, 29 March 1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA.
                                                                          7

               sources, according to the War College Division memorandum,
               placed the strength of the western German army at 2,000,000
               combat-ready troops.  To this figure were added an
               inestimable number of reserves which Germany could bring
               from the Eastern Front.  In light of these numbers, the War
               College Division placed the requisite size of an American
               force at a minimum of 1,000,000 men.
                    A Holland offensive, it was argued, would be far less
               sedentary than the Western Front -- the primary reason for
               discussing the idea at all.  Training for a Holland campaign
               would have to stress mobility and maneuver over techniques
               of trench warfare, an approach which would free the forces
               from the futile tactics of the Western Front.  A drawback
               was that the German army already had a high proficiency at
               such skills, so any American force would have to be equally
               well-trained.
                    Another advantage of a Holland offensive was the
               element of surprise.  Although shipping estimates placed the
               required transportation time of an expeditionary force to
               Holland at fourteen months, American troops could be
               quartered in England until the entire force was ready to
               embark.  The distance from the Thames to Rotterdam was only
               140 miles; this short span combined with the amount of
               available British tonnage and the experience of the British
               admiralty promised a satisfactory rate of arrival in
               Holland.
                    The uncertainties of a Holland offensive, however,
               outweighed the possible advantages.  While the American
               troops massed in Great Britain, Holland's defensive force of
               400,000 to 600,000 troops would have to withstand a
               concentrated German attack without resorting to that
               nation's best available defense -- flooding.  More
               importantly, this traditionally neutral country would not
               only have to allow an American force to march through its
               territories, but also would be required to cooperate closely
               with any such army.  All of these arguments, of course,
               danced around the most compelling strategic reason for
               rejecting this proposal.  A raw force from the United States
               would have been little match for the experienced Imperial
               German Army, and therefore any American role in the land war
               would have been shortlived if such a policy had been
               adopted.  Other than the memorandum of 29 March itself, no
               other discussion emanated from the War College Division or
               the General Staff which would indicate that the Holland
               campaign was seriously considered.
                    Captain Edward Davis, American Military Attache in
               Athens, had presented another alternative in late 1916, a
               plan for a Macedonian campaign.  His plan, studied by the
               War College Division at the same time as the idea of a
               Holland offensive, was seen as far more tempting than
               Scott's suggestion.  Yet, even though his proposal piqued
               the interest of the military planners more than the one
                                                                          8

               initially offered by the Chief of Staff, Davis's suggestion
               did not fare much better than the idea of a Holland
               campaign.^13 
                    Davis based his plan on several premises which he
               believed would lie at the root of US involvement in any
               Continental conflict.  First, the United States was
               traditionally reluctant to participate in European politics. 
               Second, the US sought no territorial aggrandizement from the
               outcome of this war.  Third, America was in the unique
               position among the Entente powers of enjoying equal
               friendship with all of the present belligerents.  Fourth,
               the United States had shown its sincere desire to remain
               neutral and preserve international law.  Fifth, the European
               nations would recognize these premises in a state of
               balance, such as after the resolution of the present war. 
               Last, America had shown its ability -- again unique among
               the Entente powers -- to exert powerful diplomatic pressure
               upon its possible antagonists.  Davis sought to find a
               possible theater of conflict which would best fit these
               principles, a theater where America could exercise its
               independence and moral superiority.  He chose Macedonia.
                    Davis believed that a Macedonian campaign would best
               suit America's purposes because it would bring about the
               speediest end to the war.  The requisite force, which Davis
               estimated to be approximately 500,000 strong, would land at
               a Macedonian port and then invade Bulgaria.  With the
               elimination of that nation from the fight, Turkey would find
               itself isolated and soon defeated, releasing one Russian and
               two British armies for operations elsewhere.  Removing
               Bulgaria and Turkey from the war would also clear the way
               for a concerted effort against Austria-Hungary by the
               Russians and Rumanians from the East, the Allies from the
               South and the Italians from Trieste.
                    The first domino of Davis's plan, Bulgaria, was the
               key.  Davis argued that this satellite of the Central Powers
               was being propped up mainly by a fear of merciless treatment
               by the Entente if it quit.  The moral presence of the United
               States would cause the Bulgarians to trust their fate to the
               Allies.  According to Davis, the United States was "the only
               country in position to combine force and fair diplomacy so
               effectively toward the ending of the war, and the Balkan
               theatre is the place for this combination."
                    When Davis submitted his plans in late 1916, the
               General Staff hardly received them enthusiastically; the
               Presidential restrictions against military planning still
               carried their full force.  In February 1917, however, after
               _                    _

                    ^13 Davis's plan, discussed in this and the following
               three paragraphs, was set forth in a series of four
               memoranda, 17 November, 18 November, 27 November, and 18
               December 1916.  RG 165/9910-1 through 9910-4, NA.
                                                                          9

               the United States had broken diplomatic relations with
               Germany because of the resumption of unrestricted U-boat
               warfare, the War College Division examined these plans in
               greater depth.  At the same time that he asked the planners
               to explore his idea of an offensive launched through
               Holland, Chief of Staff Hugh Scott ordered them to consider
               Davis's suggestions.^14 
                    The War College Division's study of Davis's idea,
               written by Colonel A.W. Catlin of the US Marine Corps and
               Major H.L. Threlkeld of the US Infantry, agreed with Davis
               that the required number of troops for a Balkan campaign
               would be 500,000.  Shipping such a force would require
               approximately ten months, and the only possible point of
               arrival seemed to be Salonica in Northern Greece, a bay with
               length, breadth and depth sufficient for a high volume of
               sea traffic.  The Entente Powers had already occupied this
               area, so there existed sufficient and suitable ground for
               encampments of American troops.^15 
                    This choice of Salonica was notable.  One of Davis's
               main arguments for such a campaign was the degree of
               independence it would afford the US war effort.  The War
               College Division rightly surmised, however, that the US had
               no chance of executing such a major action on its own; it
               lacked both the means of landing such a force and the
               armaments to supply it.  An attack by way of Salonica, the
               only feasible route for an offensive in this region, would
               inherently involve close cooperation with the Allied forces
               already there.  Such collaboration was exactly what Davis
               had sought to avoid in the original proposal of this
               alternative, and therefore the only possible means of
               implementing this strategy negated its very usefulness.
                    Even though the idea of a campaign against Bulgaria,
               whether launched in conjunction with the Allies or not,
               offered "tempting results," the War College Division argued
               that such a plan contained hurdles and dangers that might
               not justify the possible benefits.  The military planners
               pointed out that if America became involved directly with
               the Allies, the demands on American shipping would increase
               sharply, making it difficult to assemble the bottoms
               necessary to transport an expeditionary force to Macedonia. 
               Also, the dangers of submarine attack were magnified in the
               Mediterranean Sea.  Even without this extra risk of loss in
               tonnage, the War College Division concluded that Davis's
               plan, like Scott's Holland campaign involved "so largely
               _                    _

                    ^14 Scott to Kuhn, 3 February 1917.  RG 165/9433-6, NA.

                    ^15 The bay itself was ten and a half miles long, six
               miles wide, and seven to ten fathoms deep; This and
               following two paragraphs from:  Kuhn to Scott, 29 March
               1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA.
                                                                         10

               cooperation with the Navy and the joint preparation of plans
               that its practicability should be discussed from the naval
               point of view before any further steps are taken towards the
               drawing up of a war plan."
                    These War College Division discussions marked the
               extent of the quest for alternatives to the Western Front
               before Wilson's request for a declaration of war and for
               some time afterward, but the idea of other options for
               American participation, particularly in the East, was not
               dead.  F.C. Howe of the U.S. Department of Labor Immigration
               Service, warned Baker that Germany's true war aims lay in
               the East:  "Here are the oil and coal fields.  Here are some
               of the best wheat lands of Russia.  And here the Ukrainians
               are very much disaffected."  The Secretary of War safely
               ignored Howe's comments, but in September 1917, President
               Wilson himself ordered Baker to examine options to American
               military participation in France.^16 
                    Wilson submitted to Baker the plan of Major Herbert H.
               Sargeant for the "General Strategy of the Present War
               Between the Allies and the Central Powers."  Sargeant,
               himself a member of the General Staff, had given this plan
               directly to the President, probably because he foresaw the
               reception that the suggestion would receive from his
               colleagues.  He decried the three-year-old stalemate on the
               Western Front and saw little hope of either side gaining
               significant territory against the enemy's layers of
               defenses.  The entrenched lines themselves were framed by
               the neutral countries of Switzerland and Holland which
               provided little hope in Sargeant's opinion, even if they
               could be persuaded to take up arms.  His plan, then,
               involved the commitment of the smallest possible force to
               hold the line in the West while concentrating, as Davis's
               plan had suggested almost a year earlier, on the East.^17 
                    Sargeant advocated an attack against either Turkey or
               Bulgaria, the object being to cut the Central Powers in two
               and to capture Constantinople by crushing the armies of the
               Central Powers in that vicinity.  After the fall of
               Constantinople, the Allied forces would attack Austria-
               Hungary with the Russians "on the right and the Italians on
               the left."  Success in such an endeavor would defeat the
               _                    _

                    ^16 F.C. Howe to Baker, 26 June, 1917, Box 2, Document
               21, Baker Papers, LOC.

                    ^17 Sargeant's plan, discussed in this and the following
               two paragraphs and dated 6 September 1917, was sent to Baker
               by Wilson on 22 September 1917, Box 4, Document 141, Baker
               Papers, LOC.  Note that Baker himself incorrectly refers to
               this letter as having been sent on 12 September in his
               response to Wilson, 22 September 1917, Box 4, Document 140,
               Baker Papers, LOC.
                                                                         11

               Central Powers in what Sargeant saw as their most important
               theater of operations.  If the Allies could capture this
               area, "the Kaiser's hope of becoming the ruler of a great
               central empire extending from the Baltic Sea to the Persian
               Gulf [would] be permanently frustrated."
                    Sargeant offered an alternate to Davis's route to
               Turkey by way of the Mediterranean Sea.  An American Army
               could sail from San Francisco across the Pacific and Indian
               Oceans to the Persian Gulf to cooperate with an English Army
               currently in the vicinity of Baghdad.  Such a course would
               be entirely through friendly waters, and several minor bases
               such as Honolulu, Manila, Singapore, Columbo, and Bombay
               could serve as stops along the way.  In response to the
               question of adequate tonnage to carry a force across the
               Pacific, Sargeant argued that perhaps Japan could be
               convinced to assist in this endeavor.^18 
                    Where Davis's Eastern Plan had met with little detailed
               opposition as late as March, the suggestions of a Balkan or
               Near Eastern campaign that arose in September met with the
               vehement disapproval of military planners.  Proponents of
               the Western Front had gained much momentum in the few months
               since the first American forces departed for France.  The
               military planners themselves showed little interest in
               entertaining alternatives until ordered to do so by the
               Secretary of War and the President.  In July 1917, General
               Tasker H. Bliss, then Chief of Staff, submitted a series of
               papers prepared by the English War Correspondent G. Gordon
               Smith on "The Political and Military Importance of the
               Balkan Front."  The evaluation of this proposal, written by
               Captain Standiford of the General Staff, concluded that "no
               further action be taken at this time and that the papers be
               filed."  The military planners could hardly entertain
               Wilson's request with the blase attitude which they used to
               dismiss Smith's proposal; after all, it was the President
               making this suggestion, not some war journalist from
               Britain.  They were no more willing to consider the idea of
               an Eastern campaign in September than they had been in July,
               but their responses at this time offered far greater detail
               as to why such a plan was ill-conceived.^19 
                    On 28 September, Colonel P.D. Lochridge, acting Chief
               of the War College Division, issued a memorandum to the
               _                    _

                    ^18 Although his ideas would be rejected, Sargeant
               remained a committed "easterner."  See Sargeant's series of
               articles in the _North American Review_ between February and
               October, 1919, published as _The Strategy on the Western_
               _Front (1914-1918)_ (Chicago:  A.C. McClurg & Co., 1920).

                    ^19 Captain Standiford to Kuhn, 10 July 1917, RG
               165/10050-68, NA.  One can only speculate as to the shape of
               the file that Standiford would have suggested.
                                                                         12

               Chief of Staff, "Possible Lines of Action in the Eastern
               Mediterranean," relating several reasons why an Eastern
               campaign was not the proper role for the American
               Expeditionary Force.  The War College Division praised an
               Eastern campaign's goal of striking at the weakest point of
               the Central Alliance, a strategy which had worked for such
               legendary generals as Napoleon in his French Campaign in
               1814.  The distinction between this plan and Napoleon's was
               that the latter had the advantage of interior lines of
               supply; in this instance that advantage would rest with the
               Central Powers.^20 
                    Shipping a force from New York to the Eastern
               Mediterranean would involve a distance 1400 to 2000 miles
               greater than sending that same force to the West Coast of
               France.  This entire increase would be in a land-locked sea
               with an abundance of possible submarine bases.  Troops
               "going to the Eastern Mediterranean [would] have to run the
               gauntlet of submarines for approximately one-half of the
               journey," which would require dedicating a strong naval
               escort there while at the same time escorting supply ships
               for the Allies to the West Coast of France.  In sum,
               shipping for an Eastern campaign would require an additional
               45% to 62% of the time required to send a comparable force
               to France.
                    Another disadvantage of a Balkan Campaign would be the
               requirement of the attacking force to carry with it all
               supplies and munitions.  The American army was
               embarrassingly short of cannons and ammunition and was
               already forced to rely on France for its artillery needs in
               the West.  Thus, an American force landing in the Balkans
               would be unequipped for any fighting at all.
                    Lochridge also described the difficulties of the
               terrain in each of the areas of the Eastern Mediterranean
               that were possible debarkation points for a military force. 
               The mountains in Northern Italy provided a formidable hurdle
               for any planned invasion.  Lochridge pointed out that these
               mountains were so difficult to overcome that merely 50% of
               the Austrian Army had checked the entire Italian Army for
               over two years.  Lochridge also pointed out that Italy's
               system of railroads was already taxed by that country's own
               needs, let alone the requirements of a foreign expeditionary
               force.
                    Macedonia was, according to Lochridge, a "sector of
               great _apparent_ possibilities."  Even so, there were
               obstacles to the success of any campaign in this region. 
               The terrain in Albania was too rough for the movement of a
               _                    _

                    ^20 This and the following eight paragraphs are from:  P.
               D. Lochridge, acting Chief of War College Division, to Chief
               of Staff Tasker H. Bliss, 28 September 1917, RG 165/10050-
               111, NA.
                                                                         13

               large military force, so it was out of the question as a
               possible launching point of a campaign.  The ports in
               Northern Greece had their geographical limitations as well. 
               The main argument against a campaign in this area, however,
               was political.  Describing Macedonia as having been for
               centuries the "cesspool of nations," Lochridge contended
               that this area provided a microcosm of the nationality
               problem that had greatly troubled the entire Balkan region. 
               The Allied forces there included contingents from all of the
               participant countries, making harmonious cooperation
               impossible.   It was better, therefore, that the United
               States avoid becoming embroiled in this political powder
               keg.
                    Lochridge dismissed in short order the idea of
               launching a campaign from Turkey.  Not only would tremendous
               delays result from the added length of the voyage across the
               Pacific rather than across the Atlantic, but the potential
               rewards involved in a Turkish campaign were nominal.  Even
               though the Baghdad Railway, a main transportation route of
               the Central Powers, was near to the proposed landing spots
               of Smyran and Alexandretta, that section of the rail line
               was not vital to the survival of Germany and her allies. 
               Thus, the potential gains came nowhere near to balancing the
               dangers and delays of such an offensive.
                    Lochridge also objected to these alternative strategies
               on political grounds.  The American goal was to crush
               Germany and destroy its military capabilities.  As much as
               an attack against Germany's allies might hurt the Central
               Powers as a whole, it would do nothing to slow the Kaiser's
               war machine.  Since the United States had not as yet
               declared war on any nation but Germany, and since the US had
               designated itself as an "Associate" rather than an "Allied"
               power, such plans did not mesh with American diplomatic
               policy.
                    Lochridge then turned his attention to a critique of a
               possible Russian campaign.  After the first Russian
               Revolution in March 1917, which resulted in a democratic
               government, it became obvious that the Allies' Eastern Front
               was faltering.  If Germany could force a peace on Russia,
               she could free a large portion of her army for further work
               in the West.  Such worries raised the possibility of
               American intervention against Germany through Russia. 
               Although this plan alone among the proposals elicited some
               measure of enthusiasm from the War College Division members,
               it fared no better than any of the other alternatives to the
               trenches in France and Belgium.^21 
                    The War College Division refuted the idea of a Russian
               Front in the same memorandum wherein it rejected the idea of
               _                    _

                    ^21 Spector, "'You're Not Going to Send Soldiers Over
               There, Are You!'," 3.
                                                                         14

               an Eastern campaign.  The first argument against this plan
               was that Russia was largely inaccessible.  The Central
               Powers had effectively bottled up the Russian ports in the
               Black and Baltic Seas, and the neutrality of Norway and
               Sweden precluded any possible land routes through those
               countries.  An expeditionary force sent to the North would
               therefore have to sail through the Barents Sea and would
               most likely arrive at Archangel (about 700 miles by rail
               from Petrograd).  This port had facilities sufficient for
               about 40 vessels simultaneously -- a much larger overall
               capacity than the rail lines serving the port, which could
               carry an estimated 60,000 troops (with equipment) per month. 
               This route itself would also be closed by ice for about six
               months beginning in November.  A smaller port which might
               serve as an alternative to Archangel was Alexandrovsk, but
               its ship capacity was less than one sixth that of Archangel,
               and it was 250 miles farther away from Petrograd.  It was
               inaccessible during the summer months because the Murman
               Railway passed over large tracks of swampland and was
               subject to attack by the Germans, so Russia had no
               sufficient access routes from the North.^22 
                    The War College Division believed that other routes to
               Russia were equally ludicrous.  There were two ports on the
               East Coast of Russia:  Vladivostok and Nikolayevsk.  The
               former was 7000 miles away from Petrograd by rail and had
               facilities for 30 vessels.  The rails themselves had the
               capacity to haul 40,000 troops per month, but rolling stock
               was in short supply, so the actual number would have been
               even less.  Nikolayevsk was a new terminus on the Trans-
               Siberian Railroad located 900 miles north of Vladivostok. 
               Both its limited rail capacity and its shallow harbor
               prohibited it from being a possible landing point for an
               American expeditionary force.  Even if Russia had possessed
               adequate port facilities, however, the length of the voyage
               to either Archangel or Vladivostok alone would have
               prohibited an offensive via this route.  The War College
               Division listed the following distances:
                                                            _Miles_
                         New York to Havre, France           3600
                         New York to Archangel, Russia       7000
                         San Francisco to Vladivostok        7000

               In addition, the entire length of the voyage from New York
               to the West Coast of France was within a temperate climate;
               the same could be said of neither Russian port.

               _                    _

                    ^22 Alexandrovsk, which goes by the modern name of
               Poljarnii, lies at the opening of the bay to Murmansk.  This
               and the following paragraph are from:  Lochridge to Scott,
               28 September 1917, RG 165/10050-111, NA.
                                                                         15

                    Another practical hurdle to a Russian front was the
               appalling condition of Russian railways.  The United States
               government had recognized this weakness on the part of
               Russia even before the US declaration of war.  The War
               College Division explained that the sad condition of Russian
               railroads, with its shortages of rolling stock and
               locomotives, had grown even worse since the March
               Revolution.  Even if an American force could be shipped
               efficiently to one of Russia's coasts, it was doubtful that
               it could move within the country itself.^23 
                    Geographic considerations did not form the only
               arguments against a Russian campaign.  Earlier discussions
               between Baker and Major Stanley Washburn of the Special
               Diplomatic Mission to Russia had discussed the tenuous
               political situation in that country.  Washburn cautioned
               that any plans involving military cooperation with Russia
               were unlikely to succeed in 1917:  "nothing but a miracle
               can bring about a dominant military situation this summer." 
               Hurrying the Russian army into an advance could very well
               result in Russia quitting altogether.  Washburn suggested
               that America restrict involvement in that nation to economic
               aid to build its railroads and feed its citizens.  Senator
               John Sharpe Williams of Mississippi echoed Washburn's
               opposition to sending an American force to Russia,
               contending that its soldiers and citizens would resent a
               force of West Point graduates giving them orders.^24 
                    The War College Division downplayed the value of the
               Russian Front in the German war plan.  Although it seems
               hard to believe that the Central Powers would have declined
               further advances into Russian territory if the opportunity
               arose, the General Staff argued that their interior lines of
               supply and communication would be so stretched by such
               progress along their Eastern Front that they would hesitate
               to attempt it.  While the War College Division's reasoning
               was a bit lax on this point, their next argument was clearly
               true.  An invasion of Russia was not the immediate objective
               of Germany; an invasion of France was.  Thus, American
               _                    _

                    ^23 Baker to Wilson regarding the inspection of the
               Trans-Siberian Railway by American railroad experts who
               could make suggestions toward improving its efficiency, 31
               March 1917, _PWW_, 41:511.

                    ^24 Major Stanley Washburn, Special Diplomatic Mission to
               Russia, to Baker, 25 June 1917, Box 5, Document 215, Baker
               Papers, LOC.  See also Sen. John Sharpe Williams to Wilson,
               10 August 1917, Box 5, Document 68-E, Baker Papers, LOC. 
               Williams was rather uncomplimentary of the Russians people,
               arguing that their overall ignorance would lead them to
               resent an American force, but his conclusion was still
               similar to Washburn's.
                                                                         16

               participation in the East, whether in the Balkans or in
               Russia, would have left America with a relatively minor and
               peripheral role in the fighting -- a role which might have
               risked the collapse of the entire Allied cause.^25 
                    The military planners had decided on committing US
               troops to the Western Front months before talk of
               alternative strategies piqued the interest of politicians. 
               Their plan of 7 June had envisioned the progressive dispatch
               of troops to France at the rate of 120,000 per month
               starting in August.  While the rate of dispatch foreseen in
               this proposal was not realized until April 1918 -- a full
               three-quarters of a year behind schedule -- this plan is
               still significant in that it illustrates that US military
               planners had decided upon France as the proper theater for
               American influence almost from the outset of the nation's
               involvement.^26   In the context of these discussions, and
               at Baker's suggestion, the War College Division took the
               opportunity to explain and defend its choice of a Western
               campaign.  After illustrating the drawbacks and flaws of
               plans which focused on the Eastern Mediterranean or Russia,
               the planners outlined the advantages in fighting with the
               British and French in the West.  The War College Division
               argued that it would be unwise to abandon the plan that was
               already in place to reinforce the Western Front.  Decisions
               such as this, it was argued, should not be reconsidered
               unless some drastic change had occurred in the overall
               military situation of the war.  The reasoning here is the
               weakest found in the planners' arguments.  The carnage that
               had already occurred on the Western Front justifiably placed
               the burden of proof on the advocates of that strategy rather
               than on its opponents.  The War College Division did prove
               its case in subsequent arguments, but this one alone was not
               convincing.
               _                    _

                    ^25 This and the following five paragraphs are from: 
               Lochridge to Chief of Staff, 22 September 1917, Subj: 
               Strategy of the Present War, RG 165/10050-111, NA.  See also
               follow up memo from War College to Chief of Staff, 28
               September 1917, RG 165/10050-111.

                    ^26 Kuhn to Bliss, 7 June 1917, Subj:  Tactical
               reorganization required to meet requirements in the European
               theatre of war and program for the progressive dispatch of
               troops to France, RG 165/10050-30, NA.  Baker seems to have
               doubted the feasibility of this plan rather quickly,
               considering that less than a month later he told former
               Chief of Staff Hugh Scott (at the time serving with the Root
               Mission in Russia) that "no definite plan has yet been made
               about the dispatch of further troops abroad. . . ."  Baker
               to Scott, Petrograd, Russia, 1 July 1917, Box 3, Document
               113, Baker Papers, LOC.
                                                                         17

                    The military planners contended that a "sideshow"
               strategy would unnecessarily divide the American forces. 
               America had as yet declared war only on Imperial Germany,
               and therefore, unlike Great Britain in Mesopotamia and in
               Palestine, or France and Italy in Greece, the United States
               had no compelling political reasons to send troops to any
               place other than the Western Front.  In order for an
               alternative strategy to succeed, the US would have to field
               a force large enough to hold the line in the West and at the
               same time fully equip a force sufficient enough to have an
               influence in another theater.  The force on the second front
               would require its own artillery, lines of communications,
               rolling stock, bases, and sufficient personnel -- items that
               the American force alone did not have.  The United States
               was already strained in sending sufficient railroad cars and
               locomotives to supplement those in France, let alone supply
               an entire American army on its own.  The American
               Expeditionary Force already relied on the French for its
               field artillery, so it could not have supplied itself in
               another campaign.
                    Another reason why the military planners argued against
               a change in strategy was the strain on available shipping
               that the extra distances would entail.  Not only would
               American tonnage have to be dedicated to sending an entire
               army to another theater, but some of that tonnage would have
               to be used to supply, or at the very least move, the
               expeditionary forces already in France.  Great Britain did
               not have enough ships in 1917 to assist the AEF, so America
               would have to find sufficient shipping on her own.  Since
               such shipping was simply not available to the United States
               at that time, abandoning the Western Front would have been
               logistical folly.
                    The War College Division also contended that the Allies
               could not survive alone on the Western Front.  No miracles
               had occurred in the three months after the dispatch of
               Pershing's First Division, so France still needed American
               assistance.  A common bond linked the United States and
               France, a bond that dated back to the aid of the French
               Marquis de Lafayette in the American Revolution.  This bond,
               it was claimed, facilitated a degree of understanding that
               would be possible only with the French or the British -- it
               would certainly not be attainable with the Russians or any
               other group:
                         We can reinforce the Allies in greater strength
                         and more quickly on the western front and maintain
                         ourselves there better than any other.  We
                         understand the French people and they understand
                         us, our forces are received with open arms and we
                         can depend upon our forces cooperating in the
                         highest degree, and, in consequence to the end of
                         the highest effectiveness, with those of the
                         French by virtue of this understanding.  With no
                                                                         18

                         other country, except the British, is this
                         possible.^27 

                    Most importantly, the War College argued that the West
               was the decisive theater of the war.  The sideshows in the
               East were just that -- sideshows.  The German objective,
               they argued, lay with crushing France, and American
               involvement in the West would do the most to thwart that
               goal.  The military planners recognized that a deadlock had
               existed for some time in the West, but they claimed that
               American involvement to the expected degree (eventually one
               or two million men) would tip the scales decidedly in the
               favor of the Entente Powers.  The war would be won or lost
               in the West; if the United States desired to play a decisive
               role in the outcome of the war, and thereby earn a seat at
               the settlement, it would have to play that role side by side
               with the French and British in the trenches of the Western
               Front.^28 
                    By the end of September, the War College Division had
               offered its best reasoning for a western campaign, but it
               continued to receive suggestions for alternatives to this
               strategy.  George Chamberlain, Chair of the Senate Military
               Affairs Committee, forwarded to Baker a proposal of Ameen F.
               Rihani (a specialist in Middle Eastern history and
               literature and the Chair of the Syria-Mt. Lebanon League of
               Liberation in New York) which advocated a campaign through
               Turkey.  Like Sargeant's plan, Rihani advised that the
               American force travel across the Pacific Ocean.  In his
               critique of this strategy, Bliss euphemistically suggested
               that Rihani "has underestimated the difficulties of
               transporting a force there and supplying it."  The Chief of
               Staff explained that it would take at least twelve months to
               send an army of 200,000 men to the Red Sea, and that "an
               army of 200,000 men is a small one these days."  Baker chose
               not to send Bliss's letter to Chamberlain, since doing so
               might provide a dangerously detailed account of the American
               strategic thinking.  Instead, with the President's
               agreement, the Secretary of War ignored this
               recommendation.^29 
               _                    _

                    ^27 Here Lochridge was specifically applying these
               reasons to refute the idea of a Russian front, but the War
               College Division would use similar reasoning in the context
               of other alternatives.

                    ^28 Spector, "'You're Not Going to Send Soldiers Over
               There Are You!'," 3.

                    ^29 Baker to Wilson, 4 October 1917, and Bliss to
               Chamberlain (draft of a letter which was never sent),
                                                             (continued...)
                                                                         19

                    Even still the proposals continued to arrive.  Baker
               had sent Lochridge's memorandum with its three enclosures to
               the President on 11 October.  In early November, however,
               Wilson again presented to Baker the plan of Major Sargeant
               concerning "the General Strategy of the Present War between
               the Allies and the Central Powers" -- the very same plan
               which he had given to his Secretary of War in September and
               the very same plan which the War College Division had
               already rejected in the lengthy study for the President
               himself!  Surely Baker must have been puzzled when, upon his
               return to his office, he realized that Wilson had
               resubmitted Sargeant's proposal.  On 11 November Baker
               forwarded a copy of the War College Division's memorandum of
               28 September to Wilson.  In his cover letter he once again
               reiterated the arguments against a sideshow strategy for the
               AEF.  Hinting at Wilson's desire to have a seat at the
               settlement, Baker concluded by reminding the President that
               America's army had been "pledged for use on the Western
               Front in cooperation with the British and French forces
               there."^30 
                    The President finally bowed to Baker and the General
               Staff, but not before once again illustrating the great
               difference between his goals and those of the military
               planners.  Ronald H. Spector argues that news of the
               November Revolution in the nascent Soviet Union and the
               Italian disaster at Caporetto, which had cost the Allies
               40,000 casualties and a quarter-million prisoners of war,
               doused any ideas of alternatives.  Timothy K. Nenninger,
               however, suggests that one argument in particular may have
               been decisive in the eyes of the President.  The Western
               Front policy would allow the United States to play a major
               role in the war, and it therefore fit well with Wilson's
               political goals of reshaping Europe.  While this reasoning
               may have convinced Wilson, the military planners themselves
               had already decided on this course of action months earlier
               for purely military reasons.  Thus, while postwar politics
               may have entered into the final decision on whether or not
               to focus on the Western Front, it seems unlikely that the
               strategy itself was formed in the context of these
               considerations.  In the eyes of the military planners,



               _                    _

                    ^29 (...continued)
               October 1917, Box 4, Documents 160 and 160-E, Baker Papers,
               LOC; see also note 1, _PWW_, 44:361-62.

                    ^30 Baker to Wilson, 11 October 1917, _PWW_, 44:361; Baker
               to Wilson, 11 November 1917, Box 4, Document 234, Baker
               Papers, LOC.
                                                                         20

               victory was a prerequisite for any settlement, so their
               plans sought this goal foremost.^31 












































               _                    _

                    ^31 Spector, "'You're Not Going to Send Soldiers Over
               There Are You!'," 4; Stokesbury, _A Short History of World_
               _War I_, 246-48; Nenninger, "American Military Effectiveness
               in the First World War," 126-127.