III

                           AMERICA, ENTER STAGE LEFT:  MILITARY

                              PLANNING, JANUARY - APRIL 1917


                    Serious military planning began immediately after Count
               Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff presented his note to US
               Secretary of State Robert Lansing on 31 January 1917.  In
               this message Germany announced the decision which it had
               adopted earlier that month at the council at Pless; namely,
               the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in the
               waters around Great Britain, France, Italy and in the
               Eastern Mediterranean.  All ships found within this zone --
               military or merchant, enemy or neutral -- would be sunk.^1 
                    Memories of the sinking of the _Lusitania_ in 1915 arose
               both within and beyond Washington.  Still, however, the
               President believed that the US could remain detached from
               the European imbroglio.  His last attempt to avert American
               involvement was a plan to arm merchant vessels.  Such, he
               earnestly hoped, would restore American trans-Atlantic trade
               and at the same time deter Germany from committing some
               overt act which would lead to war between the two countries.
                    Wilson addressed Congress at one o'clock on 26
               February, a little more than three weeks after the break in
               diplomatic relations with the Kaiser.  While admitting that
               no major engagements had occurred between US merchant ships
               and German submarines which would merit a strong American
               response, he pointed out that many merchant ships remained
               in American ports for fear of the German U-boat. Such, he
               argued, could achieve the German goal of stifling neutral
               commerce.  He elaborated:
                         No one doubts what it is our duty to do.  We must
                         defend our commerce and the lives of our people in
                         the midst of the present trying circumstances,
                         with discretion but with clear and steadfast
                         purpose.  Only the method and the extent remain to
                         be chosen, upon the occasion, if occasion should
                         indeed arise.  Since it has unhappily proved
                         impossible to safeguard our neutral rights by
                         diplomatic means against the unwarranted
                         infringements they are suffering at the hands of
               _                    _

                    ^1 Bernstorff to Lansing, 31 January 1917, _PWW_, 41:74-9.

                                             1
                                                                          2

                         Germany, there may be no recourse but to _armed_
                         neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain
                         and for which there is abundant American
                         precedent.

               Wilson's Armed-Ship Bill passed the House on 1 March with
               only fourteen dissenting votes.  The Senate, however, proved
               less receptive.  A successful filibuster stalled the bill
               until the end of the legislative session, and Congress
               adjourned on 4 March without granting the President's
               request.^2 
                    Undaunted, the President sought legal justification for
               an executive _fiat_.  Without the approval of Congress, Wilson
               issued a statement to the press on 12 March announcing that
               all American merchant ships sailing through the areas
               proscribed in the German note would carry an armed guard,
               "for the protection of the vessels and the lives of the
               persons on board."  In retrospect it is difficult to imagine
               how this policy would have achieved the President's aims. 
               Armed guards and small deck guns only posed a threat to a
               submarine on the surface and thus were not only ineffective,
               but also might have further convinced U-boat captains to
               refrain from announcing their attacks.  Wilson's policy was
               implemented, but it would not yield the deterrence which he
               sought.^3 
                    While Wilson wrestled with and eventually sidestepped a
               defiant Congress, the War Department scrambled to assemble
               the fragments of war-plans which had been created.  In a
               memorandum to the President on 7 February, Baker outlined
               the steps so far taken to address the present crisis.  The
               eight elements of this page-and-a-half sketch included:  (1)
               a provision for giving the government priority access to the
               nation's telegraph and telephone system; (2) the initiation
               of a study in conjunction with the Baltimore and Ohio
               Railroad of possible railway transportation requirements;
               (3) estimates of the supplies necessary to increase the
               regular army and National Guard to war strength and to train
               _                    _

                    ^2 "An Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 26
               February 1917, ibid., 40:283-87; Diary of Colonel Edward
               House, 4 March 1917, ibid., 41:331-32.  See also Richard
               Lowitt, "The Armed-Ship Bill Controversy:  A Legislative
               View," _Mid-America_ 46 (January 1964):  38-47.  Lowitt
               argues, however, that the caricature of the "little group of
               willful men" defeating Wilson's bill by their filibustering
               tactics is not accurate, since most of the speeches on the
               legislation were given by supporters of it.


                    ^3 Press Statement, 12 March 1917 (Enclosure II in note
               from Robert Lansing, 9 March), _PWW_, 41:372.
                                                                          3

               a volunteer force tentatively fixed at 500,000 men; (4)
               arrangements for purchases of items such as clothing, shoes,
               food, and tents; (5) the operation of all arsenals on a two-
               shift basis for maximum output; (6) the erection of torpedo
               nets in all Atlantic-coast harbors; (7) the placement of War
               Department engineers, personnel, and arsenals at the
               disposal of the Navy; and (8) the purchase of land at
               Montauk Park for the protection of New York Harbor. 
               Although many of these steps bespeak a much more active role
               for the army, it was the last three -- the measures ensuring
               coastal defense -- which were of most immediate concern. 
               This plan offered no hint that the forces mentioned would do
               any more than guard the Atlantic harbors; and as with the
               War Plan Black, no explanation was offered of how Germany
               would pose a credible threat to American shores.  Although
               some of Baker's attention was also drawn beyond American
               shores to such places as the Philippines and the Canal Zone
               in concern for sabotage of interned German merchant vessels,
               such interest in US overseas territories was scarcely out of
               step with existing military policy and was hardly in
               recognition of possible American involvement in Europe. 
               There was certainly no hint that any US soldiers would leave
               for the Continent within only five months.^4 
                    Baker and Wilson still sought to downplay military
               planning.  Only two weeks before the break in US-German
               relations, the Secretary of War had counseled against
               sending Major General Leonard Wood to observe the
               belligerent countries for the purpose of preparing a history
               of the conflict.  Baker argued, and Wilson agreed, that
               rumors of impending cooperation between the United States
               and the countries visited by Wood would surely result from
               such a trip.  Even after the rupture of relations, Baker
               assured the President in his note concerning War Department
               actions taken as of 7 February that "I have endeavored in
               every way possible to have these steps carried out without
               publicity in order not to give rise either to excitement in
               our own country or misconstruction abroad."^5 
                    Meanwhile Chief of Staff Major General Hugh L. Scott
               was champing at the bit.  In January he had presented the
               Franklin Dinner Speech in Philadelphia.  Emphasizing that

               _                    _

                    ^4 Baker to Wilson, 7 February 1917, ibid., 41:151-2;
               Diary of Josephus Daniels 20 March 1917, ibid., 41:444-45;
               See Baker's correspondence with Colonel Chester Harding,
               Canal Zone, and Harrison, Manilla, 3-4 February 1917, Box 2,
               Documents 3, 4, 5, and 8, Baker Papers, LOC.

                    ^5 Baker to Wilson 12 January 1917 and Wilson to Baker 13
               January 1917,  Box 4, Documents 13 and 14, Baker Papers,
               LOC; Baker to Wilson, 7 February 1917, _PWW_, 41:151-2.
                                                                          4

               founding father's "zeal for preparedness in the service of
               his country," the Chief of Staff warned:
                         Nor can it be doubted that were he here tonight,
                         he would urge upon us to arm and go stand in the
                         ranks ourselves, that we may show ourselves worthy
                         of the sacrifices of our ancestors and preserve
                         for our children the liberties so dearly bought by
                         suffering and blood, lest it be written of
                         American as it has been of Jerusalem:  'Oh,
                         Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the
                         prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee,
                         how often would I have gathered you even as a hen
                         gathereth her chickens under her wing -- but ye
                         would not!  behold, your house is left unto you
                         desolate.'^6 

               Critical of what he viewed as an irrational denial of the
               inevitable, Scott lambasted the Administration's delay in a
               letter to Colonel H.J. Slocum, commander of the 13th Cavalry
               at Columbus:
                           The President does not want any action taken
                         that will give any kind of an idea to Germany that
                         we were getting ready for war.  Personally, I
                         think it would be better for her to get such an
                         idea; it would make her understand in a minute
                         what we said. . . .
                           I am sorry to lose all this good time, because
                         if we must call out the volunteers eventually, the
                         cloth is not even woven for their uniforms and we
                         are not authorized to order it.^7 

                    Scott was unwilling to sit idle.  On the very day after
               Lansing received the announcement of unrestricted U-boat
               warfare, the Chief of Staff directed the War College
               Division to consider possible overseas operations in the
               event of war with Germany.  On 2 February he sent Captain
               Davis's memoranda to the War College for its consideration. 
               Inspired by the idea of an alternative to the Western Front
               recommended by the US Military Attache in Athens, Scott
               himself suggested the possibility of a campaign through
               Holland.^8 

               _                    _

                    ^6 "Franklin Dinner, Philadelphia," 17 January 1917, Box
               81, Scott Papers, LOC.

                    ^7 Scott to H.J. Slocum, Laredo, Texas, 12 February 1917,
               Box 27, ibid.

                    ^8 Scott to Chief, War College Division, 1-3 February
               1917.  RG 165/9433-6, NA.

                                                                          5

                    It is unclear whether Baker knew of Scott's actions; if
               he did, he most certainly did not inform the President.  The
               form of the War College Division's initial response on 3
               February was markedly different from that which the
               Secretary of War presented to the President only four days
               later.  Baker had emphasized such steps as obtaining
               priority access to the nation's telegraph and telephone
               lines and erecting torpedo nets in Atlantic harbors.  The
               General Staff suggested, among other recommendations, that
               all members of the National Guard and organized militia not
               already serving under federal authority be called into such,
               that a national secret service be established under military
               control, that all aliens submit to registration and
               surveillance, that national censorship be established, and
               most importantly that military cooperation be initiated with
               the Allies as soon as war appeared certain and that any
               troops raised by the United States receive their full
               training within the country before being sent abroad. 
               Little common ground existed between the War College
               Division's initial recommendations and those which Baker
               carried to Wilson, so it is doubtful that the Secretary of
               War informed the President of the additional plans being
               made.^9 
                    The Chief of Staff almost certainly kept Wilson
               ignorant as well.  In a pair of letters early that month
               Scott himself hinted that he had exceeded the Presidential
               restrictions.  He wrote:
                         At the present time the President is not taking
                         any real steps to call out a large force.  Of
                         course we are doing what we can in a quiet way in
                         the service, but I do not think he wants anything
                         done which will show foreign nations that we are
                         getting ready until Germany does some overt
                         act.^10 

               Scott repeated this sentiment and much of this wording in
               another letter on the same day:
                         At the present time we are going ahead and doing
                         what we can in a quiet way.  The President desires
                         no step taken toward mobilization, I suppose in
                         the hope that Germany will not do any avert act. 




               _                    _

                    ^9 Lieutenant Colonel W.S. Graves, General Staff
               Secretary, to Scott, 3 February 1917, RG 165/9433-4, NA.

                    ^10 Scott to E. R. Hardin, Staten Island, NY, 6 February
               1917, Box 27, Scott Papers, LOC.
                                                                          6

                         I am not able to share in that hope myself, and
                         would like to be at work with all our force.^11 

               It was probably wise that Scott did not alert Wilson of the
               plans that were being contemplated, for surely they would
               have caused a vehement reaction on the President's part.
                    The effects of the stop-and-start approach to military
               planning in previous years were sorely felt when the General
               Staff set about studying America's potential role in the
               Great War.  The report concerning possible lines of action
               through Macedonia relied on estimates of available American
               shipping from 1 April 1916 -- almost a year out of date.^12  
               Little tangible and detailed planning could take place
               because the General Staff was still in the dark concerning
               what shape the army would take.  In response to a letter
               from a Massachusetts cadet prematurely eager to serve
               overseas, Scott complained:
                         In the case of a real break with Germany, nothing
                         in the way of an expedition to the other side of
                         the Atlantic can be done until a real army is
                         raised and trained.  Congress has not yet given
                         enough authority or money to start weaving the
                         cloth for the uniforms of the first contingent. 
                         The raising, training and equipping of a real
                         force is a matter of time, and at least a year
                         will elapse before we can get such a force
                         ready.^13 

                    Debates on military policy in Congress remained
               decidedly detached from the growing likelihood that America
               would become involved in the war.  Even the break in
               diplomatic relations with Germany did little to change this
               assessment.  S. Hubert Dent of Alabama, the new Chair of the
               House Military Affairs Committee, announced in mid-February
               that his committee had "reached the conclusion unanimously
               that at least this was not an opportune time for any radical
               changes in the military policy of this country."  He
               declared that the 1917 Army Appropriations Bill would make
               provisions for a regular force of only 135,000 soldiers. 
               _                    _

                    ^11 Scott to Mr. Charles B. Rushmore, New York, NY, 6
               February 1917, ibid.

                    ^12 Kuhn to Scott, Subj:  Studies prepared in the Army
               War College relating to possible operations in certain
               European theaters of war, Appendix A, "A Study of Conditions
               Affecting Possible Operations in the Macedonian Theater in
               Case of War With Germany," 29 March 1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA.

                    ^13 Scott to Lawrence H. Hamilton, Groton School, MA, 9
               February 1917, Box 27, Scott Papers, LOC.
                                                                          7

               Committee Member Thomas S. Crago of Pennsylvania correctly
               bragged that this bill had been drafted "not as a war
               measure but as a great peace measure."^14 
                    Unlike those measures being considered by the President
               and Congress, the plans being weighed by the War College
               Division significantly departed from previous American
               military assessments.  The size of the proposed fighting
               force was hardly exceptional, at least compared to those
               previously proposed by the General Staff; the potential
               policies were based on an army of 500,000 to 1,000,000 men. 
               The purpose of this force, however, was notable:  it was to
               be an expeditionary force to Europe.  In addition, this
               study marked a change in the fundamental approach to
               American military planning.  Instead of forming policy which
               was long-term in its focus and only loosely related to the
               events in Europe or the current requirements of US foreign
               relations, this examination was designed to address the
               probable uses and needs of the US military.^15 
                    Although the War College Division rejected the
               suggestions for a campaign through either Macedonia or
               Holland, it did not reject the concept of an expeditionary
               force.  The main drawback that it saw in these plans was
               that the armies envisioned exceeded the scope of current
               military capacity.  In addition to the time required to
               raise such a force, it would at least ten months to ship a
               half million soldiers to the Continent.  While this time
               scale was not necessarily absurd, Kuhn and the War College
               Division suggested that America refrain from sending any
               units until a complete US Army had been created.  From this
               suggestion, then, it would be mid- to late-1918 before even
               the first effects of any American military participation
               might be felt.  Kuhn concluded, "While the enclosed studies
               on Macedonia and Holland cannot be made the basis of any
               practical plans until our general relations with other
               belligerents are settled, they emphasize the fact that a
               long period of time must elapse before we can be capable of
               any effective action under our modern military conditions. .
               . ."^16 

               _                    _

                    ^14 S. Hubert Dent, 15 February 1917, and Thomas S.
               Crago, 16 February 1917, _Congressional Record_, 64th
               Congress, 2nd Session, 3370 and 3436, quoted in Finnegan,
               _Against the Specter of a Dragon_, 186.

                    ^15 Kuhn to Scott, "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,"
               29 March 1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA.

                    ^16 Kuhn to Scott, 29 March 1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA; see
               Chapter 5 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of
               the General Staff's evaluation of these proposals.
                                                                          8

                    A key element of the "modern military conditions" which
               Kuhn mentioned were the armaments of a modern fighting
               force:  those fire weapons which had demonstrated their
               brutal effectiveness so ruthlessly and had helped to foster
               the inertia of trench warfare.  In this area, too, America
               was lacking.  Even by the time it finally embarked from New
               York in late May 1917, Pershing's force had ready for issue
               only 285,000 Springfield rifles, less than 1,500 machine
               guns, 400 light field guns and 150 heavy field guns.  Except
               for 3-inch shells, the US possessed artillery ammunition
               sufficient for less than nine hours' worth of firing, even
               considering the limited number of guns available.  Even
               though America would possess significantly larger volumes of
               these weapons by the end of the fighting, it was grossly
               ill-equipped in early 1917.^17 
                    In addition to equipping a force with modern weapons,
               the War College Division recognized that a necessary
               prerequisite for involvement in the war would be the raising
               of a mass army.  It therefore took this opportunity to
               advocate conscription once again.  Four days before
               Germany's announcement at the end of January, Scott had
               received at his own request a "Plan for a National Army"
               from the War College Division.  This plan had called for a
               regular army of 310,000 backed by a first line defense of
               2,500,000 citizen-reservists who would begin an eleven month
               program of universal military training at age nineteen. 
               Some General Staff members, including Assistant Chief of
               Staff Major General Tasker H. Bliss, recognized the plan as
               a political absurdity, especially since the US was not at
               war.  They suggested instead that the military pursue a
               policy of selective rather than universal training, but
               Scott presented the study to Baker as it stood.  Baker did
               _                    _

                    ^17 General John J. Pershing, _My Experiences in the World_
               _War_, 2 vols. (New York:  Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931),
               1:26-28.  By the time of the Armistice the US would have
               1,761,00 rifles, 2,106 75mm guns and 1,485 heavy guns in
               France, with approximately half as many of each also in the
               United States.  Many of the products of America's
               mobilization, however, would never see use in the war.  An
               example was America's effort to meet the nation's
               requirements of gunpowder, estimated by Major General
               William Crozier, Army Chief of Ordnance, to be 300 million
               pounds for the period May 1917 to May 1918.  Although
               founded in December 1917 and created with the goal of
               producing 700,000 tons of gunpowder per day, Nitro, West
               Virginia (named after the gunpowder itself -- Nitro
               Cellulose), was only producing 350 tons per day by November
               1918.  William D. Wintz, _Nitro:  The World War I Boom Town_
               (Charleston, WV:  Pictorial Histories Publishing, 1985), 3-
               4, 39-42.
                                                                          9

               nothing with the study at that time, but the General Staff
               would refer to this examination in the weeks to come and
               would repeat its calls for some form of a draft following
               the rupture of diplomatic relations.^18 
                    On 14 February Scott received from Kuhn a plan for
               raising, equipping, quartering and training an army of
               4,000,000 men.  Historians Edward Coffman and Timothy K.
               Nenninger have claimed that President Wilson endorsed the
               plan, but it is doubtful that the idea of conscripting such
               a large army was so readily accepted.  It seems that the War
               College Division recognized the slim chance of realizing its
               plan and felt compelled to issue a revision.  On 20 February
               Kuhn submitted to Scott, "in view of the fact that it may
               not be possible to secure enactment of the legislation
               required for universal service," an alternative plan for
               raising an army of half-a-million men, "under the provisions
               of existing law."    Although recognizing that political
               realities might preclude the adoption of draft legislation,
               the War College Division nonetheless restated its support
               for that approach:  "The War College Division is convinced
               that the _best_ plan for raising such a force involves the
               adoption of universal liability to military service."^19 
                    Support for universal military training was of course
               nothing new for the military planners.  It was their
               willingness to consider this approach to raise the
               Continental Army which had been one factor in the demise of
               that plan.  Even before the President had endorsed
               preparedness, one member of the War College Division,
               Captain George Van Horn Moseley, had strongly advocated
               universal military training in spite of the political
               liabilities of such a policy:
                         We are not concerned with the question as to
                         whether the consideration of the question of some
                         form of compulsory military training is a
                         practical one for the party in power but our
               _                    _

                    ^18 Kuhn to Scott, "Plan for a National Army," 27 January
               1917, RG 165/9876-9, NA.  Bliss to Scott, 31 January 1917,
               RG 165/9876-13, NA.

                    ^19 Kuhn to Scott, 14 February 1917, RG 165/9876-29, NA,
               cited in Coffman, "The American Military and Strategic
               Policy in World War I," 72; Timothy K Nenninger, "American
               Military Effectiveness in the First World War," in _Military_
               _Effectiveness_, vol. 1, _The First World War_, ed. Allan R.
               Millet and Williamson Murray (Boston:  Unwin Hyman, 1989),
               117-18.  Coffman and Nenninger do not elaborate on their
               claim that Wilson "endorsed" the plan.  Graves to Kuhn, 3
               February 1917, RG 165/9433-7, and Kuhn to Scott, "Plan for
               Raising an Army of 500,000 Men," 20 February 1917, RG
               165/9433-7.
                                                                         10

                         opinion should be correctly recorded in answer to
                         the question -- can a practical system of National
                         Defense adequate to our needs, be established
                         which does not include in some form the principle
                         of compulsory military training?^20 

                    Following the retirement of James Hay, the long-time
               Chair of the House Military Affairs Committee and habitual
               opponent of the General Staff, the War College Division had
               called for "universal liability to military training in time
               of peace" in a December 1916 report concerning the proper
               military policy of the United States.  In testimony before a
               Senate Committee on 19 December 1916, the Chief of Staff
               himself had advanced the possibility of a peacetime draft to
               secure the numbers of soldiers required for adequate defense
               of the nation:  "The time has come when this country must
               resort to universal liability to military training and
               service."  With war raging so distantly, the American public
               and their representatives were hesitant to support such a
               measure.  This opposition would eventually yield now that
               the war seemed much closer, but the change of heart within
               the President would not be spurred mainly by military and
               strategic considerations.  Although Wilson eventually
               reached the conclusion of the General Staff concerning
               conscription, he did so by a significantly different
               path.^21 
                    Baker and Wilson had been neither strong supporters nor
               vehement opponents of the draft.  As early as January 1916
               the Secretary of War had expressed sympathy for a draft's
               ability to raise a large army while reducing the social and
               economic disruption associated with unregulated voluntarism. 
               Through conscription, the Administration could control who
               exactly left the workforce to join the military.  Wilson had
               been quite receptive to Section 79 of the National Defense
               Act of 1916, the so-called "Hayden joker" which permitted
               him to fill vacancies in the National Guard by means of
               conscription during wartime "if for any reason there should
               not be enough voluntary enlistments."  The administration
               emphasized that this power was limited to wartime exercise
               _                    _

                    ^20 See Joe Decker, "Progressive Reaction to Selective
               Service in World War I" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
               Georgia, 1969), 19-41; Chambers, _To Raise an Army_, 73-124;
               Captain George Van Horn Moseley to Chief of Staff, 1 March
               1915, RG 165/9317-2, NA, cited in Decker, "Progressive
               Reaction to Selective Service in World War I," 21-2.

                    ^21 War College Division to Scott, 9 December 1916, RG
               165/9832-1, NA.  Scott had requested this report on 31
               October 1916; Testimony before Senate Committee on Military
               Affairs, 19 December 1916, RG 165/9876-14.
                                                                         11

               only, however, and did not consider advocating a peacetime
               draft.^22 
                    After 3 February 1917, both Baker and the President
               echoed these ambivalent feelings toward a draft.  Baker and
               Wilson were at this time committed to reliance upon
               volunteers to form the greatest portion of military manpower
               and were willing to adopt conscription only after
               voluntarism began to wane.  On 6 February Baker warned
               Wilson that "great suspicion would be aroused if compulsory
               military service were suggested at the outset and before any
               opportunity to volunteer had been given."  In spite of the
               arguments of the nation's military planners, Wilson and
               Baker viewed the draft as the last, not the first
               resort.^23 
                    On 3 February Baker had asked the War College Division
               for a plan to raise "a large volunteer force . . .
               tentatively fixed at 500,000 men."  In its response the War
               College Division referred to its "Plan for a National Army"
               of 27 January and strongly urged the adoption of universal
               military service.  Baker continued to demand a force
               consisting of volunteers, not conscripts, to back up the
               _                    _

                    ^22 Chambers, _To Raise an Army_, 126-27; Baker to Wilson,
               26 December 1916, with  enclosed memorandum from Enoch H.
               Crowder, 26 December 1916, and Wilson to Baker, 26 December
               1916, _PWW_, 40:327-330.  Wilson had issued this
               interpretation following challenges to this portion of the
               1916 Act brought by Amos Pinchot, who feared that this
               provision (originally inserted by Rep. Carl Hayden of
               Arizona) amounted to an under-handed attempt at
               conscription, and who urged its immediate repeal.  Many
               others also urged the President to revoke that portion of
               the Act, including Henry Morgenthau, Lillian D. Wald and
               Charles T. Hallinan, Editorial Director of the American
               Union Against Militarism, who labelled Section 79 "blood
               tax" and threatened that Wilson would lose the votes of
               250,000 Quakers and millions of Socialists.  The President
               demurred, however, and cited that even such strong opponents
               of the draft as James Hay largely concurred with the
               Administration's view.  See Pinchot to Wilson, 9 August
               1916, Wilson to Pinchot, 11 August 1916, Hallinan to
               Tumulty, 18 August 1916 and 23 August 1916, Morgenthau to
               Wilson 20 September 1916, and Wald to Wilson 23 November
               1916, all cited in James W. Pohl, "The General Staff and
               American Defense Policy:  The Formative Period, 1898-1917"
               (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1967), 383-88.

                    ^23 Baker to Wilson, 6 February 1917, Box 4, Baker
               Papers, LOC.  See also Daniel R. Beaver, _Newton D. Baker and_
               _the American War Effort, 1917-1919_ (Lincoln:  University of
               Nebraska Press, 1966), 22-24.
                                                                         12

               regulars and National Guard.  Reluctantly the War College
               Division presented a plan on 15 March for invoking the
               Volunteer Act of 1914, but it still enumerated its reasons
               for favoring conscription.  These reasons were simple and
               were reiterations of arguments which had been used by Scott
               and the General Staff before:  the British experience had
               shown volunteer enlistments to be unpredictable and fickle,
               voluntarism was too inelastic to allow for great expansion
               to meet the developments of war and conscription remained
               the only feasible means of raising such a large army in such
               a short time with minimum disruption to the rest of
               society.^24 
                    Such military rationale, however, would fall upon the
               President's deaf ears.  Contrary to some historical
               accounts, the President did not order his Secretary of War
               to draft conscription legislation on 4 February.  The actual
               date was 22 February and the bill was designed to give the
               President the authority to "raise" (but not to "use") an
               army if Germany committed some overt act while Congress was
               not in session.  Although this legislation did make
               provisions for conscription, such an approach would occur
               only after volunteering began to wane.  Even the President's
               personal decision for war on 20 March did not alter his
               desire to rely first and foremost on volunteers for
               America's military needs.  Scott reported that in a meeting
               on 24 March the President had made clear that he would
               resort to the draft only after the failure of the volunteer
               system.  Most likely, Wilson wished to avoid a confrontation
               with those same legislators who had rejected the Continental
               Army the previous Spring.  The turning point would thus have
               to come in the form of a political challenge stronger than
               the threat posed by the Congressional Democrats.^25 
               _                    _

                    ^24 Secretary for Chief of Staff to Kuhn, 3 February
               1917, RG 165/9433-7, NA; Kuhn to Scott, Subj:  A Plan for an
               Expansible Army of 500,000 men based upon Universal
               Liability to Military Service, 20 February 1917, RG
               165/9433-7, and Kuhn to Scott, Subj:  500,000 Volunteers in
               Addition to Regular Army and National Guard, 15 March 1917,
               RG 165/9433-7.

                    ^25 The traditionally accepted date of 4 February was
               mis-remembered by Crowder in a speech on 15 March 1928 and
               was accepted in David A. Lockmiller, _Enoch H. Crowder,_
               _Soldier, Lawyer, and Statesman_ (Columbia, MO:  1955), 152-
               54.  Others have accepted it with little question, including
               John K. Ohl, "Hugh S. Johnson and the Draft, 1917-18,"
               _Prologue_ 8 (Summer 1976):  86; Ferrell, _Woodrow Wilson and_
               _World War I_, 16; and Frederick S. Calhoun, _Power and_
               _Principle:  Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy_
                                                             (continued...)
                                                                         13

                    In an unexpected _volte face_ Wilson changed his mind on
               selective service and put his full weight behind the measure
               almost immediately after he had made clear once again that
               he favored a system of volunteers.  Suddenly the President
               ordered that volunteers would be used only in the regulars
               and the National Guard; the remaining force of between
               500,000 and 1,000,000 men would be "raised and maintained
               exclusively by selective draft."  As historian John W.
               Chambers, II, points out, this change of heart is
               significant because in doing so Wilson had thrown his
               support behind a system of conscription that flew in the
               face of antiwar and antidraft sentiment, the tradition of
               the volunteer system and perhaps even his support among many
               of his own party members in Congress.^26 
                    Chambers discounts the role of military advice, since
               both the President and the Secretary of War had repeatedly
               heard the same suggestions from Scott and the General Staff
               for some time.  He rejects the tension of international
               circumstances as motivating the President, since war had
               seemed quite likely since 1 February and since Wilson openly
               advocated a volunteer system for a week after the famous
               Cabinet meeting of 20 March.  In addition, since the
               Commander-in-Chief had made no decision concerning whether
               or not to send an American army overseas, it seems doubtful
               that his decision resulted from a thorough understanding of
               the impending commitment which loomed in the future for the
               United States.  Chambers concludes that Wilson's decision
               was motivated in great part by his desire to thwart the
               efforts of his political rival Theodore Roosevelt to raise a
               volunteer division for immediate service in France.  Here
               again, then, the influence of political consideration over
               military analysis is clear.^27 
               _                    _

                    ^25 (...continued)
               (Kent, OH:  Kent State University Press, 1986), 163.  For a
               detailed analysis of the reasons for and effects of this
               measure, see Chambers, _To Raise an Army_, 131-35; Scott to
               Brigadier General E. St. James Greble, 24 March 1917, Box
               28, Scott Papers, LOC.

                    ^26 Baker to Wilson, 29 March 1917, Enclosure, "Summary
               of the Bill to Increase Temporarily the Military
               Establishment of the United States," _PWW_, 41:500-01. 
               Eventually the conscripted "National Army" would comprise
               seventy-seven percent of the total number of soldiers.  See
               Kennedy, _Over Here:  The First World War and American_
               _Society_, 149-50; Chambers, _To Raise an Army_, 134-35.

                    ^27 For an account of that meeting see "Memorandum of the
               Cabinet Meeting, 2:30-5 pm," 20 March 1917, _PWW_, 41:436-44;
                                                             (continued...)
                                                                         14

                    Early in February the former Rough Rider, now almost
               sixty years old and blind in one eye, had written Baker
               about the possibility of raising a volunteer division and
               sailing abroad.  Many Republicans supported the former
               President's idea.  In the eventual congressional debate on
               the Selective Service Bill, Augustus P. Gardner of
               Massachusetts remarked, "If Roosevelt or any other Pied
               Piper can whistle 25,000 fanatics after him, for Heaven's
               sake give him the chance."  Baker, however, gently declined
               the suggestion.  Unwilling to relent, Roosevelt pressed his
               proposal throughout the following weeks.  Wilson would
               clearly never allow such an usurpation of political and
               military power.  Historian David M. Kennedy notes that
               "there was . . . a chance that Roosevelt might contrive to
               make this martial buffoonery appear to be the stuff of
               genuine heroism and adventure -- a demonstration of
               patriotic success which Republicans could be expected to use
               to bludgeon the Democratic administration."  The task thus
               fell to Baker on 20 March to reject Roosevelt's offer more
               firmly.  The Secretary of War explained that Congress had
               not yet authorized an army and that general officers must be
               drawn from the ranks of the regulars.  Roosevelt still
               refused to yield and sent a telegram on 23 March reminding
               Baker that he was "a retired Commander in Chief of the
               United States Army and eligible to any position of command
               over American troops to which I may be appointed."^28 
               _                    _

                    ^27 (...continued)
               Baker to Scott, Petrograd, Russia, 1 July 1917, Box 3,
               Document 115, Baker Papers, LOC:  "The first part of
               Pershing's expeditionary force left about the middle of
               June. . . .  No definite plan has as yet been made about the
               dispatch of further troops abroad. . . ."  For a discussion
               of the eventual decision to send an army overseas, see
               Chapter 4 of this thesis; Chambers, _To Raise an Army_, 134-
               41.

                    ^28 Roosevelt to Baker, 2 and 7 February 1917, and Baker
               to Roosevelt, 3 and 9 February 1917, _Letters of Theodore_
               _Roosevelt_, ed. Elting E. Morison, 8 vols. (Cambridge: 
               Harvard University Press, 1951-54), 8:1087-88.  See also
               Seward W. Livermore, _Politics is Adjourned:  Woodrow Wilson_
               _and the War Congress, 1916-1918_ (Middletown, CT:  Wesleyan
               University Press, 1966), 15-31; Frederick L. Paxson,
               _American Democracy and the World War_, vol. 2, _America at_
               _War, 1917-1918_ (New York:  Cooper Square Publishers, 1966
               [Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1939]), 7-8; Kennedy, _Over Here: _
               _The First World War and American Society_, 149; Roosevelt to
               Baker, 19 March 1917 and Baker to Roosevelt, 20 March 1917,
               Box 3, Document 59, Baker Papers, LOC.  See also Morrison,
                                                             (continued...)
                                                                         15

                    Undoubtedly surprised at such audacity, Baker forwarded
               this message to Wilson on 26 March.  Equally astonished, the
               President called Roosevelt's telegram "one of the most
               extraordinary documents I ever read!"  He thanked his
               Secretary of War for allowing him to "undergo the discipline
               of temper involved in reading it in silence!"  The following
               day, 28 March, the President met with Baker and formally
               approved the exclusive reliance upon the draft to raise all
               soldiers beyond those to be formed within the regular army
               and the National Guard.  Chambers argues that since this
               policy would preclude any volunteer units whatsoever,
               including and especially a division commanded by the Bull
               Moose himself, Wilson embraced it.  Thus, although the
               President remained unconvinced by the pleadings of America's
               military planners for a long time, he eventually bowed to
               their goals.  He did so, however, neither because of nor in
               consultation with these advisors in the War College
               Division; his decision was independent of military
               considerations and was based instead on political efficacy. 
               While on the surface it appeared that, as James W. Pohl has
               noted, "the President, the Secretary of War, and the General
               Staff were in accord on the central question of developing
               manpower through conscription," the plans of the General
               Staff and the goals of the President meshed much more by
               coincidence than by design.^29 
                    At 8:32 pm on 2 April 1917, Wilson stood before the
               Joint Session of Congress.  Armed neutrality had failed to
               dissuade Germany's submarine campaign, and Wilson believed
               that only one avenue remained -- war.  Seated directly in
               front of the Speaker's desk was the Supreme Court.  The
               Cabinet was on one side while behind them sat, for the first
               time at such a joint session, the Diplomatic Corps in full
               evening dress.  The House was called to order and the Vice-
               President entered followed by the Senate.  All of the
               senators but two -- Robert M. La Follette and James K.
               Vardaman -- wore or carried a small American flag.  As the
               ovation died down following his introduction, the President
               began to read from the papers on the podium before him:
                         Gentlemen of the Congress:  I have called the
                         Congress into extraordinary session because there
                         are serious, very serious choices of policy to be
                         made, and made immediately, which it was neither
               _                    _

                    ^28 (...continued)
               ed., _Letters of Theodore Roosevelt_, 8:1164; Roosevelt to
               Baker, 23 March 1917, enclosure in Baker to Wilson, 26 March
               1917, _PWW_, 41:469-71.

                    ^29 Wilson to Baker, 27 March 1917, _PWW_, 41:478;
               Chambers, _To Raise an Army_, 138; Pohl, "The General Staff
               and American Defense Policy," 391.
                                                                         16

                         right nor constitutionally permissible that I
                         should assume the responsibility of making.

               The President followed with a thirty-six minute oration
               documenting the causes which he believed justified a
               declaration of war.  It was to be a battle joined "for
               democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to
               have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and
               liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of
               right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace
               and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last
               free."  In spite of the President's claim that "what this
               will involve is clear," few plans existed beyond the initial
               decision to adopt conscription as the method to raise the
               army.  Fundamental choices including whether or not to send
               an expeditionary force to Europe, and if so when and where
               best to exercise America's military influence, remained to
               be decided in the weeks and months ahead.^30 






























               _                    _

                    ^30 "An Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 2 April
               1917, _PWW_, 41:519-27.  See also Millis, _Road to War_, 436-43.