II

                          EXPOSITION:  AMERICAN MILITARY PLANNING

                                   PRIOR TO JANUARY 1917


                    Two traits characterized American strategic planning
               for land warfare prior to 1917 -- its rarity and its
               narrowly domestic scope.  The military did make plans before
               the rupture of US-German diplomatic relations in early
               February 1917, and some of these plans recognized that the
               conflict in Europe might at least indirectly affect the
               United States.  Nonetheless, those plans that did exist
               before 1917 largely ignored events across the Atlantic and
               thus formed a weak foundation for the eventual wartime
               mobilization and extra-continental commitment.
                    The roots of American military planning for World War
               I, although notably shallow, do extend back prior to August
               1914.  Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson initiated the War
               Department General Staff's first comprehensive military
               policy.  He collected a series of articles concerning
               military planning in the _Independent_ in the spring of 1912,
               and published them as the pamphlet, _What is the Matter With_
               _Our Army?_  Answering the title question, Stimson wrote in
               the final article, "The trouble with the Army comes down,
               therefore, to our lack of an intelligent military policy in
               dealing with it."  A few months later he ordered Captain
               John M. Palmer of the General Staff to draw up a plan for
               organizing all of the land forces in the US.  To preempt a
               recalcitrant Congress from dismissing the study as the
               General Staff's isolated expression of opinion, Stimson
               ensured that the sixty page report on the "Organization of
               the Land Forces of the United States" was not approved until
               all general officers in the continental US had the chance to
               state their views.^1 
               _                    _

                    ^1 Henry L. Stimson, "What is the Matter with Our Army,"
               _Independent_ 72 (18 April 1912):  827-28.  See also the other
               articles in the series:  Major General Leonard Wood, 301-04;
               Brigadier General W.W. Wotherspoon, 338-44; Brigadier
               General Clarence R. Edwards, 408-11; Lieutenant Colonel
               Hunter Legget, 460-64; Major George H. Shelton, 619-23; and
               Brigadier General Robert K. Evans, 777-80.  This and the
                                                             (continued...)

                                             1
                                                                          2

                    Although the report completely omitted the topic of
               economic mobilization and was to a large extent merely a
               restatement of the views held by various military
               Progressives that the army should be organized along more
               efficient, business-like models, it was significant in that
               it was a comprehensive collection of these sometimes
               fragmented ideas and that it was issued by the ostensible
               planning arm of the War Department.  The topics covered in
               the report included:  relations between the naval and land
               forces, relations between domestic forces and those abroad,
               land forces within the United States, the peacetime
               administration of the regular land forces, the importance of
               a reserve system, tactical organization of mobile troops,
               the relationship between promotion and organization, the
               organization and raising of national volunteer forces,
               considerations affecting the organization of the American
               land forces and a council of national defense.
                    The report highlighted the weakness of the traditional
               American reliance upon the citizen soldier -- namely, the
               lack of adequate training, without which no soldier could be
               expected to face a modern foe.  The report claimed that
               American history "is full of the success of the volunteer
               soldier after he has been trained for war, but it contains
               no record of the successful employment of raw levies for
               general military purposes."  The General Staff's study thus
               focused in large part on the partial organization and
               training of militiamen in order to have a "means for
               preparing great armies of citizen soldiers to meet the
               emergency of modern war."  The ultimate proposal included a
               provision for a six-year enlistment period for the regular
               army, consisting of three years on active duty followed by
               another three years in the reserve.  Those soldiers in the
               reserves could quickly expand the regular army to a war
               footing without thinning its strength with raw recruits. 
               The study also suggested the creation of a reserve officers'
               program consisting of those men who had received military
               training in college.  To solve the problem of poor training
               for citizen soldiers and to bypass the highly politicized
               influence over the National Guard, the General Staff
               suggested a national militia based on Congressional
               districts instead of the traditional state control.  Behind
               these layers of soldiers would stand the volunteers, ready
               for mobilization if the regular army and the National Guard
               together could not meet the situation.  The combination of
               these three levels of the regular army plus its reserves,
               _                    _

                    ^1 (...continued)
               following three paragraphs come from:  John M. Palmer,
               _America in Arms_ (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1941),
               142-46; "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United
               States," 1:69-128.
                                                                          3

               the national militia and the volunteers could yield the
               estimated requirements of 460,000 mobile troops and 42,000
               static coastal defense troops in the event of war with a
               first-class power.  The study concluded:
                         The complete organization of the mobile land
                    forces of the United States will, therefore, include
                    three distinct forces.
                         1.  A Regular Army organized in divisions and
                    cavalry brigades and ready for immediate use as an
                    expeditionary force or for other purposes for which the
                    citizen soldier is not available, or for employment in
                    the first stages of war while the citizen soldiery is
                    mobilizing and concentrating.
                         2.  An Army of national citizen soldiers organized
                    in peace in complete divisions and prepared to
                    reenforce the Regular Army in time of war.
                         3.  An army of volunteers to be organized under
                    prearranged plans when greater forces are required than
                    can be furnished by the Regular Army and the organized
                    citizen soldiery.
                         The peace establishment of the Regular Army with
                    the organized division districts of the National Guard
                    should include the machinery for the recruiting,
                    organization, and mobilization of this great third line
                    of the national defense.

                    With the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in January
               1913, Stimson and the military planners lost all opportunity
               of seeing their proposals implemented immediately.  Although
               shelved for the time being, this seminal work by the General
               Staff was to serve as the foundation for American military
               policy in the coming years.
                    The claim that military planning during the early part
               of Woodrow Wilson's administration did not exist or that it
               concentrated solely on the defense of the North American
               continent is only technically untrue.  While marking
               significant advances in military policy, two of the great
               war plans, "Orange" in the event of a war with Japan and
               "Black" in case of hostilities with Germany, focused mainly
               on coastal defense and only tangentially on the defense of
               American territories abroad.  In both of these plans the
               navy would serve as the first line of defense, with the army
               relegated to a supporting role.  In spite of their seemingly
               global outlook, these plans emphasized almost exclusively
               the defense of the homeland.^2 
                    Formed to counter a possible attack by the German High
               Seas Fleet on either the West Indies or the American
               _                    _

                    ^2 Other war plans existed, including contingencies for
               hostilities with Great Britain and a plan for an invasion of
               Canada.
                                                                          4

               mainland, Black clearly illustrated America's introverted
               approach to defense.  The US fleet, based in Guantanamo,
               Cuba, and Culebra, Puerto Rice, would confront the German
               ships approximately 500 miles out at sea and prevent the
               landing of any troops.  No thought was given to the
               possibility of meeting the High Seas Fleet any farther away
               from the American continent, and little realistic evaluation
               was made of the strategic and logistical difficulties and
               slim likelihood of such a German invasion.^3 
                    On the surface, Orange seemed much more global in its
               approach.  Completed in 1914 and focused on the defense of
               Manila in the event of a Japanese attack, this plan called
               for a naval battle within 1,200 miles of the Philippines. 
               This strategy, however, was unrealistic.  By way of the
               Panama Canal, Pearl Harbor, Midway and Guam, the first
               section of the US fleet would reach Manila in sixty-eight
               days.  In comparison, the Japanese fleet and troop
               transports could arrive there in eight.  The army detachment
               on the island would thus have to hold out for at least two
               months before the first American ships arrived.  To compound
               the absurdity, this plan failed to consider the actual
               capability of the US Navy in 1914.  While Congress had
               approved appropriations for a battleship fleet superior to
               that of the Japanese, the unbalanced US fleet lacked
               necessary auxiliary ships, including colliers and oil supply
               tankers.  The battleships could hardly reach San Francisco
               without assistance, much less make a voyage of 10,000 miles
               from their Atlantic base to Manila.^4   American military
               planning thus continued to focus on the defense of American
               soil and continued to do so with little reference either to
               the nation's increasingly expansionist foreign policy or to
               its realistic capabilities.
                    One might have expected the events following the
               assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 to
               awaken America to its military weakness.  The outbreak of
               war certainly exposed the nation's lack of preparation to
               some in the military, as evidenced by the request in August
               1914 of the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Department at
               Governor's Island in New York:  "we are without European
               maps and without funds to buy them at this headquarters. . .
               .  You will probably have some maps at the War College from
               which you might send us a few.  If so, please do so at
               once."  Some in the military also took notice of the
               _                    _

                    ^3 "War Plan Black," War Portfolios, _General Board_
               _Records_, Navy Department, Washington, cited in John A.S.
               Grenville and George Berkeley Young, _Politics, Strategy, and_
               _American Diplomacy:  Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917_
               (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1966), 319.

                    ^4 "War Plan Orange," cited in ibid., 317-18.
                                                                          5

               unprecedented, rapid manpower mobilization implemented by
               the European powers (except, of course, Britain, which
               rejected conscription until 1916), but the disintegration of
               the tenuous balance of power on the Continent did little to
               spark the development of a cogent military policy.  The
               American public in late 1914 and early 1915 would simply not
               accept a change in America's detached posture towards both
               diplomacy and the military, especially if such a change
               might entangle the US in the problems of Europe.  Even naval
               expansion, which might have been justified to protect
               America from the heat of the European fire, was repressed,
               since many believed that it was exactly this type of naval
               competition which had sparked the blaze in the first place. 
               The dangers of a European war, even one of this magnitude,
               would have to seem far more immediate than the battlefields
               of France and Belgium before America would accept a greater
               emphasis on military planning.^5 
                    In the summer of 1915 America's isolationism and
               military complacency seemed to experience a shock as rude as
               the one felt on board the _Lusitania_ at 2:10 pm on 7 May. 
               The intervening years have perhaps blurred the view of just
               how startling the sinking of this ship was.  People years
               after the war could remember exactly where they had been
               when they learned of the fate of the _Lusitania_.  The acute,
               public outrage at the loss of American lives echoed within
               the halls of the White House.  With his twin notes on 21
               July to Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison and Secretary
               of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Wilson called for a defense
               program that he could submit to Congress in his next annual
               message.^6 
                    Wilson's call for preparedness clearly illustrates the
               gulf between the military's concerns and those of the
               President.  Many reasons underlay Wilson's support for
               preparedness; viewed by some historians as chief among them
               was his desire to mediate a settlement among the belligerent


               _                    _

                    ^5 William G. Haan to Charles Crawford, 1 August 1914,
               quoted in Coffman, "American Military and Strategic Policy
               in World War I," 70; Martin and Kreidberg, _History of_
               _Military Mobilization_, 189-90; John W. Adams, "The
               Influences Affecting Naval Shipbuilding Legislation, 1910-
               1916," _Naval War College Review_ 22 (December 1969):  52.

                    ^6 Walter Millis, _Road to War:  America, 1914-1917_
               (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935), 164; John M. Cooper,
               Jr., "World War I:  European Origins and American
               Intervention," _Virginia Quarterly Review_ 56 (Winter 1980): 
               8-9; Wilson to Garrison and Wilson to Daniels, 21 July 1915,
               _PWW_, 34:4-5.
                                                                          6

               powers.^7   Arthur Link and John W. Chambers, II, contend
               that Wilson perceived the need for substantial military
               force in order for the US to command the respect of major
               military powers necessary to mediate among them.  In support
               of this argument they cite Wilson's discussion with American
               pacifist leaders in May 1916, in which the President stated,
               "The peace of society is obtained by force. . . .  And if
               you say we shall not have any war, you have got to have the
               force to make that 'shall' bite."^8 
                    One must carefully note, however, that this statement
               by Wilson came almost a full ten months after his memoranda
               to Daniels and Garrison, almost eight months after the
               sinking of the _Arabic_ and two months after the sinking of
               the _Sussex_.  Much time had passed between the President's
               call for preparedness and his May 1916 address during which
               his views toward the belligerents, and especially Germany,
               could have hardened.  In addition, neither the policy
               initially suggested by the War Department nor the one
               eventually backed by the President would have done much to
               increase Allied and Entente respect for Wilson's attempts at
               mediation.  European countries would have paid little
               attention to an army tethered to American shores, no matter
               what its size.  If Wilson's reason to support preparedness
               came predominately from his desire to mediate a settlement -
               - or even as Robert E. Osgood suggests, from a genuine fear
               that the US might find itself at war with Germany in the
               near future --  then he surely misunderstood the capability
               of his military.^9   While his goals of mediation surely
               influenced his view toward preparedness and most definitely
               did not preclude such a policy, they probably did not
               provide the initial, or even the strongest roots for it. 
               While the Presidential endorsement did give the General
               Staff planners a long awaited opportunity to consider a
               revision of American military policy, Wilson's decision was
               motivated in great part by domestic political interests and
               _                    _

                    ^7 Arthur S. Link, _Woodrow Wilson:  Revolution, War, and_
               _Peace_  (Arlington Heights, IL:  Harlan Davidson, 1979), 21-
               46, updated edition of Link, _Wilson, the Diplomatist:  A_
               _Look at His Major Foreign Policies_ (Baltimore:  Johns
               Hopkins University Press, 1963 [1957]); May, _The First World_
               _War and American Isolation, 1914-1917_, 175-78.

                    ^8 Wilson, "A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness
               Leaders," 8 May 1916, _PWW_, 36:645-46; Link and Chambers,
               "Woodrow Wilson as Commander-in-Chief," 321-22.

                    ^9 Robert E. Osgood, _Ideals and Self-Interest in American_
               _Foreign Relations:  The Great Transformation of the_
               _Twentieth Century_ (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press,
               1953), 206-07.
                                                                          7

               largely unrelated to a genuine concern for military
               preparation.
                    Public agitation for preparedness, which grew as
               Germany rebuffed Wilson's diplomatic protest notes over the
               _Lusitania_ incident, threatened to undermine the President's
               support in the next election.  Based on Hudson Maxim's best-
               selling book, _Defenseless America_, the motion picture _Battle_
               _Cry of Peace_ (1915) served to sensationalize the issue as it
               portrayed a vulnerable United States cowering before an
               unnamed but easily identifiable foe's attack on New York
               City.  Press polls showed overwhelming majorities in favor
               of increasing the army and navy.  Joseph P. Tumulty, the
               President's personal secretary, suggested in August 1915
               that the Republicans would have two potential campaign
               issues:  "the tariff and the question of national defense." 
               A strong plan for the latter would preempt half of the
               Republicans' strategy for the 1916 campaign.  Tumulty
               further pointed out the elements of a sound defense policy:
                         In this matter we must have a sane, reasonable and
                         workable programme.  That programme must have in
                         it, the ingredients that will call forth the
                         hearty support of, first, the whole Cabinet (and
                         particularly the Secretary of War); second, the
                         leaders of the party in the Senate and the House;
                         third, the rank and file of Democrats in both
                         Houses; fourth, the Army and the Navy; and last
                         but not least, the great body of the American
                         people.^10 

               While Tumulty realized that a workable plan for national
               defense clearly must have the support of the military,
               political and popular support seemed to him to be of greater
               concern.  Tumulty's advice came after Wilson's requests in
               July for drafts of military policies and therefore was not
               the direct spark for preparedness, but Wilson had almost
               certainly realized that much political capital could be
               gained or lost through such an issue.
                    The evolution of this campaign for preparedness further
               illustrates that, as historian John Patrick Finnegan has
               noted, "the compartment between American foreign policy and
               American defense policy was watertight."^11   Wilson
               sometimes sacrificed rational military planning to political
               concerns.  Such was the fate of the Continental Army Reserve
               _                    _

                    ^10 Ibid., 132-33; George C. Herring, Jr., "James Hay and
               the Preparedness Controversy," _Journal of Southern History_
               30 (November 1964):  383; _New York Times_ 26 May and 26
               August 1915; Joseph P. Tumulty, _Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him_
               (Garden City, NY:  Doubleday, Page & Co., 1921), 240-41.

                    ^11 Finnegan, _Against the Specter of a Dragon_, 40.
                                                                          8

               Plan, which both came out of and formed a foundation for
               Wilson's decision for preparedness.
                    Secretary of War Garrison had taken a head start on
               Wilson's request for a revision of military policy.  At the
               behest of the newly appointed Assistant Chief of Staff,
               Tasker H. Bliss, and with Wilson's consent, Garrison had on
               11 March asked Brigadier General Montgomery M. Macomb, Chief
               of the War College Division, to submit by 15 June an update
               of the Stimson Plan of 1912, paying special attention to the
               recommended strength of the regular army and organized
               militia, the question of reserves, the problem of organizing
               and supplementing volunteer forces and the amount of reserve
               material and supplies that the army should keep in
               store.^12 
                    General Macomb or another member of the War College
               Division met with the Secretary of War every two or three
               days to keep him up-to-date on the planning.  Nonetheless,
               progress was slow.  The War College Division planners had
               produced little of substance by the mid-June deadline. 
               Garrison had received a vague, one-page memo which included
               a statement regarding the regular army and outlined the
               steps involved in both calling up the National Guard and in
               enlarging munitions productions.  Garrison's concern,
               however, lay in the organization and nature of the reserves,
               since he accurately perceived that such formed the bulk of a
               modern army, or at least one that Americans might be willing
               to adopt at that time.^13 
                    Nearly a month after the deadline, the War College
               Division issued its product, the "Epitome of Military
               Policy."  Although based on the Stimson Plan, the Epitome
               went beyond the recommendations of its 1912 predecessor.  In
               _                    _

                    ^12 Bliss to Garrison, 15 February 1915, Bliss Papers,
               Box 189, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, cited in
               Ball, _Of Responsible Command_, 133.  Garrison to Macomb, 11
               March 1915, and Bliss to Macomb, 17 March 1915, Record Group
               165 (Records of Chief of Staff, War Plans, and War College
               Division), File 9053-1, National Archives, Washington, DC
               (hereafter, RG 165, NA), cited in Finnegan, _Against the_
               _Specter of a Dragon_, 44; Wilson to Garrison, 21 July 1915,
               _PWW_, 34:4; Bliss had been appointed Assistant Chief of Staff
               on 13 February 1915.  Frederick Palmer, _Bliss, Peacemaker: _
               _The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss_ (New
               York:  Dodd, Mead & Co., 1934), 102.

                    ^13 Scott to Garrison, 13 May 1915, Box 18, The Papers of
               Hugh L. Scott, Library of Congress Manuscript Division
               (hereafter, Scott Papers, LOC); Scott to Macomb, 16 June
               1915, RG 165/9053-33, NA, and Macomb to Scott, 18 June 1915,
               RG 165/9053-34, NA, cited in Finnegan, _Against the Specter_
               _of a Dragon_, 47.
                                                                          9

               that earlier proposal the General Staff had suggested a
               gradual increase of the army by annual increments to a goal
               of three complete infantry divisions in the continental US
               during peacetime.  After these three were complete, the army
               would beseech Congress for a fourth.  The Epitome, on the
               other hand, requested the four divisions and their auxiliary
               units immediately.  All units would be kept at war strength,
               thus providing 281,000 soldiers.  The mobile forces in the
               US alone would total 121,000 men, a number greater than the
               entire existing army.  In addition, these mobile forces
               would be backed by a tremendous reserve.  The Epitome also
               recommended that the term of enlistment be two years of
               active duty followed by a six-year stint in the reserves. 
               Within eight years, according to the War College Division's
               calculations, 500,000 fully trained troops would be
               available for service.^14 
                    The War College Division's recommendations did not stop
               at raising a force of half-a-million.  Conjuring up the
               threat of a possible German invasion of 435,000 soldiers, it
               suggested an additional line of defense numbering another
               half million to back up the regular army and its reserves. 
               Astutely criticizing the tradition of a trained militia and
               civilian soldiers as inadequate for modern warfare, the War
               College Division extended a suggestion made by the Secretary
               of War for a federally trained and controlled peacetime
               force.  Under this plan volunteers would train three months
               out of the year for three years.  If war erupted they would
               require only three more months of training to be ready for
               use.  The General Staff labeled this plan the Continental
               Army, a name which was "appropriate, distinctive, and
               possessing grand historical associations."  If fully adopted
               and implemented, the War College Division's plan would
               eventually be able to yield a force of one million soldiers
               within ninety days.^15 
                    There is no evidence that the General Staff had any
               hidden agendas in these recommendations.  It was not
               surreptitiously trying to prepare for a war overseas, as
               _                    _

                    ^14 "Epitome of Military Policy," 10 July 1915, RG
               165/9053-49, NA, cited in Finnegan, _Against the Specter of a_
               _Dragon_, 47-8.

                    ^15 "Study No. 7," May 1915, RG 165/9053-22, NA;
               Memorandum for Chief of Staff on Report of Captain Nolan, 30
               June 1915, RG 165/9053-40, NA, cited in ibid., 49-50. 
               Finnegan notes that the War College Division's assumption
               that Germany could land 435,000 troops and 91,457 animals on
               the East Coast in 15.8 days was absurd, suggesting as it
               does that the US Navy would be "impotent to prevent the
               troop-carrying armadas from shuttling across the Atlantic
               with the regularity of the Staten Island Ferry."
                                                                         10

               many contemporary opponents of preparedness feared.  There
               is no indication in the record of the military planners that
               they saw this proposal as the prelude to US action in the
               war.  Also, to claim that the US leaders were preparing for
               such American participation is to claim that they had a firm
               idea of what exactly such involvement would entail, an
               assumption which crumbles in the light of the course of
               American planning once war appeared certain.^16 
                    In addition, this policy's strong similarities to
               Stimson's study of 1912 -- a proposal made prior to the
               outbreak of the war in Europe -- suggest that this more
               recent plan also sought foremost to secure adequate
               protection of the United States.  First, although the 1915
               Epitome provided for a marked increase in the size of the
               nation's military, it still shared that earlier plan's goal
               of domestic defense.  It lacked the provisions for naval
               cooperation which would have been necessary to send this
               force abroad.  Second, both documents sought long range
               goals.  The Continental Army would require three years to
               grow to its envisioned strength, hardly the type of plan
               that would have been made if involvement in Europe had been
               the goal.  The large size of the force was admittedly
               alarming, especially in comparison to traditional American
               peacetime armies, but it was not to be a standing army and
               was to a great extent a recognition of some of the dangers
               of modern warfare.  While the German invasion mentioned by
               the General Staff was clearly fanciful, and although the
               Atlantic Ocean did not provide the "easy avenues of
               approach" which the military planners feared, the US would
               not have the time for a sluggish approach to manpower
               mobilization if attacked by a modern and powerful foe. 
               Earlier plans for domestic defense had focused almost
               exclusively on coastal fortifications, but the Epitome
               recognized the need for orderly and rapid manpower
               expansion.  The large army suggested by the War College
               Division was the honest, if misguided and inflated,
               assessment of the nation's needs for domestic protection; US
               participation on the battlefields of Europe was not the
               purpose of the General Staff's proposal.^17 
                    Regardless of how forthright the military planners
               might have been about their motivations, of course, the War
               College Division had seemingly confirmed anti-preparedness
               fears of militarism.  Although incorrect in their
               accusations that the General Staff was forming plans to send
               _                    _

                    ^16 See Chapters 3 through 5 of this thesis.

                    ^17 "Statement of a Proper Military Policy," 114; James
               L. Abrahamson, _America Arms for a New Century:  The Making_
               _of a Great Military Power_ (New York:  The Free Press, 1981),
               105-06.
                                                                         11

               a force to Europe, two August 1915 newspaper articles which
               claimed that the military was making plans to call 1,000,000
               men were not completely off the mark.  The President had
               surely not envisioned this type of military policy in his
               notes to Garrison and Daniels in July.  The story that
               Wilson threatened to dismiss the entire General Staff if he
               learned that these allegations were true is most likely the
               stuff of legends.^18   Nonetheless, the War College Division
               felt compelled to issue an outright denial of the
               newspapers' charges:
                           The article in the Baltimore Sun of Tuesday
                         morning, August 24, 1915, headed 'May Call
                         1,000,000 Men,' purporting to give an account of
                         the plans for war with Germany, is made up out of
                         whole cloth and does the General Staff and the
                         Army War College great injustice in ascribing to
                         them the preparation of plans based on the 'idea
                         of sending an army to Europe.'
                           No such plans have ever been prepared, nor even
                         contemplated by the General Staff.

               In addition, M.B. Mercer, Chief Clerk of the War College
               Division, sent a memorandum early in 1916 to the civilian
               employees of the Division, cautioning them "to engage in no
               discussion whatever concerning the progress of the European
               War and especially to refrain from the expression of any
               views of a partisan nature in connection therewith."^19 
                    The General Staff's plan met with opposition even
               within the military.  Lieutenant Colonel W.H. Johnston,
               himself a General Staff officer, questioned whether the army
               could obtain enough men for this proposal.  In the past
               fiscal year, the army had recruited only 35,941 men, far
               short of the General Staff's annual requirement of 320,000
               for the regular army and Continental force.  It was doubtful
               _                    _

                    ^18 _Washington Post_, 21 August 1915, and _Baltimore Sun_,
               24 August 1915; According to Link and Chambers, the most
               often cited source for this claim is Frederick Palmer,
               _Newton D. Baker:  America at War_, 1:40-41.  Palmer himself
               cites an undated memorandum by Major General Tasker H. Bliss
               who supposedly heard the story from Assistant Secretary of
               War Henry C. Breckinridge.  The editors of the _Papers of_
               _Woodrow Wilson_, however, have been unable to find any direct
               evidence to support the contention.  Link and Chambers,
               "Woodrow Wilson as Commander in Chief," 346.

                    ^19 Memorandum for Chief of Staff Hugh L. Scott from
               Brig. Gen. Macomb, Chief of the War College Division, August
               1915, RG 165/6966-152, NA; Memorandum from M.B. Mercer,
               Chief Clerk, War College Division, 31 January 1916, RG
               165/6966-176, NA.
                                                                         12

               that the army could find almost ten times more interested
               recruits than it had the year before, Johnston argued, since
               able-bodied young men could hardly be expected to give up
               their jobs periodically "simply to receive [the regular army
               pay of] 50 cents a day. . . ."  Volunteers would simply not
               suffice.  Conscription was the only possible means by which
               such a force could be raised, but although many military
               planners privately favored such an idea, the United States
               in 1915 was hardly ready to accept a peacetime draft.^20 
                    Not surprisingly Garrison could not accept the General
               Staff's study.  In addition to the flaws pointed out by
               Johnston, the $506 million first-year price tag -- a four-
               fold increase in the army's current budget -- would "chill,
               if not effectively destroy" any support for preparedness. 
               On 2 August Garrison returned the study to the General Staff
               for revision, asking it to produce a plan that would have a
               chance of gaining Congressional approval.  Since existing
               facilities could house no more than 140,000 troops, he
               instructed the military planners to use that figure for the
               regulars and to rely on the Continental Army for the
               remainder of the nation's defense needs.^21 
                    The War College Division's eventual proposal, the
               "Statement of Proper Military Policy for the United States,"
               included a regular army of 140,000 and a Continental Army
               raised in annual increments of 133,000 until a reserve force
               of 400,000 was established.  The regulars would enlist for a
               two-year tour of active duty followed by four years of
               reserve obligation.  Those who volunteered under the
               Continental Army Plan would commit to periodic training over
               three years without obligation except that they return to
               the army "in the event of war or imminence thereof." 
               Although it never explicitly determined the exact amount of
               training, the General Staff used a period of two months per
               year to figure the costs of the proposal.^22 
                    Although a bit more reasonable than its predecessor,
               the General Staff's revision still contained many of the
               political liabilities of the earlier "Epitome."  It made no
               mention of how the army planned to raise the necessary
               numbers of recruits, so the specter of conscription still
               haunted the plan.  More fatal to this policy, however, was
               _                    _

                    ^20 Memoranda by W.H. Johnston, 17 June 1915, RG
               165/9053-38, NA, and 14 August 1915, RG 165/9053-71, NA,
               cited in Finnegan, _Against the Specter of a Dragon_, 51.

                    ^21 Garrison to Wilson, 17 September 1915, _PWW_, 34:482-
               85.  Garrison to Macomb, 2 August 1915, RG 165/9053-49, NA,
               cited in ibid., 51-2.

                    ^22 "Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United
               States," 1:113-35.
                                                                         13

               that by looking to the Continental Army reserves to
               supplement the regulars, the General Staff completely
               abandoned the organized militia as a first-line defense.  In
               addition to the military planners' disdain for the quality
               of the militia as a fighting force, there were other factors
               which weighed in this conclusion.  First, the army wanted a
               unified force under a central and standard command; the
               fragmented nature of the existing state militias threatened
               America's security.  Second, there was great concern that
               any attempt to federalize the militia would be struck down
               as unconstitutional, and the military planners were
               rightfully hesitant to base the national defense on
               contestable legislation.  Although fully supported by the
               Secretary of War, his senior advisors and even the President
               himself, this aspect of the General Staff's policy would be
               its doom.^23 
                    Attempting to undermine the power of the National Guard
               through a volunteer reserve force did not sit well with the
               militia's powerful supporters in Congress, especially
               states' rights advocates from the South such as James Hay,
               Chair of the House Military Affairs Committee.  Although a
               long-standing opponent of military expansion, Hay had
               initially relented and agreed to be "guided in large measure
               by the President's views" on national defense.  This was
               only true until the War Department's proposed legislation so
               blatantly affronted the militia.  Although Hay reiterated
               his support for a brief time after Garrison had submitted
               the Continental Army Plan, he soon retreated from this
               position as other Democrats in Congress reconsidered their
               own backing of the proposal.^24 
                    In addition to defending the National Guard in
               principle, some feared that any program of national training
               would put weapons into the hands of African-Americans.  In
               October General Wilbur Fisk Sadler, Jr., a prominent Trenton
               banker and the Adjutant General of the New Jersey National
               Guard, warned Wilson that many adjutants general of the
               Guard, "especially those from the South," strongly opposed
               _                    _

                    ^23 Finnegan, _Against the Specter of a Dragon_, 53-5;
               Herring, "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy," 389;
               Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 15 of the US Constitution
               grants Congress the power "to provide for calling forth the
               Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
               Insurrections and repel Invasions."  It makes no explicit
               provision for sending the Militia beyond the shores of the
               nation.

                    ^24 _New York Times_, 22 September 1915; Herring, "James
               Hay and the Preparedness Controversy," 388; Martha Derthick,
               _The National Guard in Politics_, Harvard Political Studies
               (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1965), 33-44.
                                                                         14

               Garrison's plan and believed "that the Continental Army in
               their sections will be composed of negroes, the only men
               that can be gotten if the troops are apportioned as
               proposed."^25 
                    Realizing that his preparedness programs faced stiff
               opposition, Wilson took his case directly to the nation's
               people.  With addresses to the New York Federation of
               Churches, the Railway Business Association and the Motion
               Picture Board of Trade on 27 January, the President kicked
               off a week-long campaign which took him through several
               major midwestern cities, including Pittsburgh, Cleveland,
               Waukegan, Kenosha, Racine, Milwaukee, Chicago, Joliet, Rock
               Island, Davenport, Iowa City, Grinnell, Des Moines, Topeka
               and Kansas City.  On 3 February Wilson delivered the final
               speech of the tour before an audience of 18,000 in the Saint
               Louis Coliseum.  With the exception of the stop in Topeka,
               throngs of supporters warmly received him.  An estimated one
               million Americans had turned out in frigid temperatures to
               greet him or hear him speak.  Confident in his power of
               moral suasion, the President labelled the campaign "a most
               interesting and inspiring experience, much fuller of
               electrical thrills than I had expected."^26 
                    This apparent groundswell of support, however, was
               illusory.  Pacifists were still pacifists; the President's
               speeches had done nothing to persuade them and had even
               alarmed some.  William Jennings Bryan, in his magazine, _The_
               _Commoner_, wrote that Wilson was "actually considering a
               state of war in which the United States will be the
               aggressor."  In addition, by speaking to city audiences in
               the Midwest, Wilson missed those in the rural areas who most
               staunchly opposed preparedness.  More importantly, of
               _                    _

                    ^25 Sadler to Wilson, 30 October 1915, _PWW_, 35:138-41. 
               See also John Whiteclay Chambers, II, _To Raise an Army:  The_
               _Draft Comes to Modern America_ (New York:  Free Press, 1987),
               107-12.  Much of the opposition to the Selective Service
               Bill in May 1917 would be based on similar sentiment, as
               indicated by Mississippi Senator James K. Vardaman's fear
               that conscription of blacks would put "arrogant strutting
               representatives of the black soldiery in every community,"
               quoted in David M. Kennedy, _Over Here:  The First World War_
               _and American Society_ (New York:  Oxford University Press,
               1980), 159.

                    ^26 Wilson to Richard Olney, 7 February 1916, _PWW_,
               36:138.  The texts of the Presidents speeches can be found
               in ibid., 36:4-19, 26-48, 52-73, 75-85, 87-122; for
               newspaper accounts of the campaign, see _New York Times_, 27
               January - 3 February, 1916.  See also Arthur S. Link,
               _Wilson_, vol. 4, _Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916_ (Princeton: 
               Princeton University Press, 1964), 45-9.
                                                                         15

               course, Wilson's campaign did little to impress opponents of
               preparedness within Congress, including Percy E. Quinn of
               Mississippi and William Gordon of Ohio, two members of the
               House Military Affairs Committee who conducted a number of
               anti-preparedness rallies to rebut the President's tour.^27 
                    On 5 February 1916, Hay informed Wilson that the
               Continental Army did not meet with his Committee's approval. 
               The Cleveland _News_ had correctly prophesied at the beginning
               of the preparedness debate that "Mr. Hay will have what
               amounts to the deciding voice in any measure for national
               defense," and that voice opposed the War Department's plan. 
               He instead suggested federalizing the militia, a proposal
               that could provide the numbers of men that the War
               Department sought, but one that Garrison would find
               unacceptable because it still failed to yield a force under
               a single authority.^28 
                    On 9 February, Garrison wrote Wilson, "If . . . we are
               not in agreement upon the fundamental principles, then I
               could not, with propriety, remain your seeming
               representative."  In attempting to force Wilson to confront
               Congress, Garrison sealed his own fate.  While committed to
               preparedness as a concept, much of the President's support
               stemmed from political opportunity, and he would not risk
               his relationship with his own party members in the
               legislature to secure any particular plan to which he was
               not dedicated.  The President had even written to Garrison's
               strongest opponent that "I [do] not consider myself
               irrevocably or dogmatically committed to any one plan of
               providing the nation with [an adequate defense]."  The
               President faced the option of having his plan killed in
               Congress or of accepting Hay's proposal.  He quickly made
               his decision.  Wilson responded to his Secretary of War the
               next day, warning Garrison "to draw very carefully the
               distinction between your own individual views and the views
               of the administration."  Upon receipt of Wilson's letter,
               Garrison submitted his resignation and together with

               _                    _

                    ^27 William Jennings Bryan, "Do You Want War?" _The_
               _Commoner_ 16 (February 1916):  1-2; Arthur S. Link, _Woodrow_
               _Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917_, The New American
               Nation Series, ed. Henry Steele Commager and Richard B.
               Morris (New York:  Harper & Row, 1954), 185-86; _New York_
               _Times_, 28 and 31 January 1916.

                    ^28 Cleveland _News_, 28 July 1915; Hay to Wilson, 5
               February 1916, _PWW_, 36:134-35.  Coincidentally enough, this
               plan, which also provided for the creation of the Reserve
               Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at educational institutions,
               had been drawn up with the assistance of the General Staff's
               old nemesis, former Adjutant General Fred C. Ainsworth.
                                                                         16

               Assistant Secretary of War Henry C. Breckinridge walked down
               the halls of the War Department and out of the building.^29 
                    Following Garrison's departure, Wilson deferred to
               Congress, endorsing Hay's plan of a federalized militia. 
               While dead in name, the idea of a national volunteer reserve
               force remained alive in concept.  At Judge Advocate General
               Enoch Crowder's suggestion, George Chamberlain, Chair of the
               Senate Military Affairs Committee, included in his Army
               Reorganization Bill of March 1916 a proposal for a volunteer
               reserve plan more flexible than the Continental Army.  This
               attempt at compromise met with the same objections as had
               Garrison's plan, and although it survived five weeks of
               committee hearings, it died on the floor of the House in May
               1916.  In the vacuum created by Wilson's withdrawal of
               support, the influence of the National Guard combined with
               America's reluctance to accept anything that hinted at
               peacetime conscription and again killed any thoughts of a
               national reserve force.^30 
                    The eventual National Defense Act of 3 June 1916
               provided for an increase of the regular army to 175,000 over
               a five-year period.  In addition to establishing the Reserve
               Officers' Training Corps, the Act enlarged the Military
               Academy.  In recognition of the importance of industrial
               mobilization in modern warfare, the Act created the Council
               of National Defense composed of the Secretaries of War,
               Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, and gave
               the President the authority to appoint an advisory committee
               of experts from outside of the President's cabinet,
               "qualified by the possession of special knowledge of the
               industrial and commercial resources of the country," to work
               in conjunction with the Council.  Finally, to meet the
               nation's potential manpower needs, the Act provided the
               means to bring the National Guard into federal service,
               enlarged the militia from its current strength of 100,000 to
               400,000 over five years and permitted the Guard to operate
               outside the United States.  The suggestions of a volunteer
               reserve force subject solely to federal training and control
               had been completely rejected.^31 
               _                    _

                    ^29 Garrison to Wilson, 9 February 1916, _PWW_, 36:143-44; 
               Wilson to Hay, 18 January 1916, ibid., 35:499-500; Wilson to
               Garrison, 10 February 1916, ibid., 36:162-64; Herring,
               "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy," 394; Finnegan,
               _Against the Specter of a Dragon_, 90.

                    ^30 Finnegan, _Against the Specter of a Dragon_, 149-53.

                    ^31 "Report of the Secretary of War," in _War Department_
               _Annual Reports, 1916_, 23-59; Kreidberg and Henry, _History of_
               _Military Mobilization_, 193-96; Paxson, "The American War
                                                             (continued...)
                                                                         17

                    The Continental Army found both its birth and its
               demise in the context of Presidential politics.  Perceiving
               an issue which might both further his diplomatic goals
               abroad and at the same time undermine a Republican challenge
               to his incumbency at home, Wilson latched onto and fostered
               the growing preparedness sentiment.  When a major part of
               that very preparedness policy threatened to subvert his
               backing among his own party members in Congress, however,
               Wilson withdrew his tenuous support for his Secretary of War
               and acquiesced to the demands of the legislature.  Although
               some of the General Staff's suggestions were largely
               unrealistic even in military terms, others -- such as its
               rejection of the National Guard as the first line of defense
               -- reflected perceptive realizations of America's needs and
               resources and were policies that the US would be forced to
               adopt when it finally committed itself to the fight in
               Europe.  Political efficacy rather than strategic
               considerations guided Wilson's reaction to these General
               Staff proposals.  While he had clearly demonstrated civilian
               authority over the nation's war-planning and war-waging
               machine, he had also foreshadowed that he would make many of
               his decisions on military policy with relatively little
               consideration given to the realistic considerations of the
               military means to support his increasingly interventionist
               diplomacy.^32 
                    Wilson's diplomacy continued to grow more global in its
               approach, even after Garrison's resignation.  Signed on 17
               _                    _

                    ^31 (...continued)
               Government, 1917-1918," 56-7.  Paxson points out that it was
               the provision for the advisory committee which would yield
               the great power of the Council of National Defense, since
               otherwise it would have merely been a conglomeration of
               Cabinet officials each with their own separate departments
               and concerns.

                    ^32 For a more supportive interpretation of Hay's plan to
               federalize the militia, see Herring, "James Hay and the
               Preparedness Controversy," 402-04.  Herring argues that
               while Hay's proposal did not adequately prepare the US for
               involvement in the war, neither would the Continental Army,
               which would not have reached its full size until 1921.  In
               addition, Herring argues that Hay's plan facilitated the
               incorporation of the National Guard in the nation's defense
               program once America had declared war and that those Guard
               units which did see combat fought well under the able
               leadership of commanders such as Douglas MacArthur.  While
               Herring's argument does force one to recognize the merit of
               the National Guard, the US would nonetheless be forced to
               abandon the militia as the mainstay of American defense once
               the full demands of involvement were realized.
                                                                         18

               February, the House-Grey Memorandum seemed to promise
               American intervention on the side of the British and French
               if Germany rejected calls for a conference to end the war. 
               The exact nature of the President's proposed intervention
               was unclear, since less than two weeks earlier he had
               effectively killed the only existing, viable means of
               raising an army which might have had even a remote chance of
               influencing events in Europe.  While the Continental Army
               would have had little immediate effect in strengthening the
               American armed forces, it was a step toward a more
               realistic, if distant, military policy.  After its demise,
               Wilson offered no alternative which might have lent credence
               to his foreign policy, and therefore the gap between the
               plans of the military policy-makers and the desires of the
               President continued to grow.  It would not be bridged in the
               immediate future.^33 
                    Although no doubt disheartened by Wilson's withdrawal
               of support both for Garrison and for the Continental Army,
               the General Staff did not give up on considering military
               policy in the context of an American confrontation with
               Germany.  Such consideration, however, was still noticeably
               domestic in its focus and therefore still markedly distinct
               from the President's diplomatic efforts.  In early 1916, in
               response to the Allied decision to arm merchant vessels,
               Germany adopted a policy of unrestricted U-boat warfare. 
               Alarmed by conjecture in the public press concerning
               relations with Germany, General Hugh L. Scott, serving as
               interim Secretary of War, asked the War College Division on
               24 February if any plans existed for action "in the event of
               a complete rupture" with Germany.^34 
                    Macomb's response came five days later.  Alluding to
               the "Statement" of 1915, he explained that the existing
               plans assumed a German invasion of North America. 
               Recognizing that Germany at that time posed little threat of
               immediate attack, he suggested to Scott that, in the event
               of the complete severance of diplomatic relations, the
               President be asked to take measures to safeguard against
               sabotage of munitions plants, arsenals and depots; to
               implement the listing by the Census Bureau of all aliens of
               the Central Powers; to establish national censorship; to
               issue a call for 400,000 volunteers to bring the regular




               _                    _

                    ^33 Link, _Wilson_, vol. 4, _Confusions and Crises, 1915-_
               _1916_, 101-41.

                    ^34 Scott to Macomb, 24 February 1916, RG 165/9433-1, NA. 

                                                                         19

               army to war strength; and to summon the militia to provide
               for seacoast defense.^35 
                    Apparently Scott had acted independently when he made
               his request.  No record exists in the _Papers of Woodrow_
               _Wilson_ indicating that the President instructed Scott or
               that the Chief of Staff informed Wilson of the War College
               Division's response.  Unfortunately, the cabinet diaries of
               Josephus Daniels are missing for the year 1916, so it is
               impossible to determine whether Scott made any mention of
               his request at Cabinet meetings.  Therefore, no conclusions
               can be drawn about Wilson's reaction to these plans.  This
               individualistic approach on the part of Scott, however,
               illustrates the frequent lack of communication that existed
               between the President and the military planners.  Such a
               lack of coordination is almost understandable; surely Wilson
               would have hamstrung any such planning if he had learned
               about it, and certainly such plans, had they become public,
               would have created a political and diplomatic embarrassment
               for the President who had kept the nation "out of war." 
               Even though the United States would begin to send an
               expeditionary force across the Atlantic in less than a year-
               and-a-half, military policy-making still existed in only a
               fragmented form.^36 
                    On 24 March 1916 a German U-boat torpedoed the French
               steamer _Sussex_, injuring several Americans.  Greatly
               angered, Wilson sent a note to the German government
               demanding that they renounce their submarine policy. 
               Germany finally acquiesced on 4 May, but not before this
               event had further tarnished that nation in Wilson's eyes. 
               Meanwhile, the British Secretary of State for War, Field
               Marshal Lord Kitchener, was meeting with Lieutenant Colonel
               Charles O. Squire, the American Military Attache in London. 
               Kitchener suggested that a break in diplomatic relations
               between Germany and the United States would inevitably lead
               to war, either through a German declaration or through some
               overt act that would force Wilson's hand.  The two discussed
               the possibility of committing an American expeditionary
               force to European soil.  Kitchener claimed that American
               involvement would hasten the war's conclusion and, when
               pressed, even claimed that it would do so "at least by the
               end of the year."  Either Kitchener's assessment of the
               American military was grossly unrealistic or, more likely,
               he was hoping to entice the Wilson administration into
               joining the fight through the promise of a hasty finish. 
               _                    _

                    ^35 Confidential Memorandum for the Chief of Staff
               [Scott], from Macomb, 29 February 1916, RG 165/9433-1, NA.

                    ^36 David E. Cronan, ed., _The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus_
               _Daniels, 1913-21_ (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press,
               1963).

                                                                         20

               Kitchener also suggested that American troops be trained in
               France instead of in the United States so that they could
               enter combat "in the shortest possible time."^37 
                    Newton D. Baker, easing into his new position as
               Secretary of War, received this memorandum with little
               interest.  Again, no evidence exists that Baker briefed
               Wilson on this meeting between Kitchener and Squire,
               probably for the same reason that Scott had kept his
               questions to the War College Division hushed.  In addition,
               Wilson was apparently kept ignorant of discussions to
               mobilize US shipping to carry an American army to Europe in
               the event of war.  This proposal, prepared on 4 April by
               American naval and military attaches in London and Paris and
               by two American officers assigned with the British
               Expeditionary Forces, warned that "any system adopted at the
               moment and operated without previous study and experience is
               more than apt to bring discredit on the Navy, and useless
               danger to the army and the Nation."  Even the military
               planners ignored this recommendation until November 1916. 
               Again, coordinated military planning was forsaken and once
               more American military leaders neglected realistic
               contingencies, leaving the consideration of such ideas to
               the very eve of the American declaration.^38 
                    While the administration and the military leadership
               were doing their best to avoid any hint of war-planning, the
               American Military Attache to Athens, Captain Edward Davis,
               sent a series of memoranda in November and December 1916
               suggesting a strategy in the event that US forces were sent
               overseas.  Fearing that the US might be forced to enter the
               war as the belligerent powers courted Japanese involvement
               to the detriment of American interests, his plan sought to
               avoid the bloody inertia of the Western Front and instead to
               concentrate the nation's forces for an offensive in
               Macedonia.  Davis's plans had some serious strategic
               omissions which the War College Division would point out
               once they considered them in depth.  On the other hand, he
               astutely observed the need for coordination of political and
               military ends, an approach that would unfortunately not be
               adopted any time soon.  These proposals, had they become
               _                    _

                    ^37 Arthur Walworth, _Woodrow Wilson_, vol. 2, _World_
               _Prophet_, 2nd rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD:  Penguin Books, 1965
               [1958]), 32-35; Memorandum from Squire to Secretary of War
               Newton D. Baker, 27 April 1916, Box 1, Document 64, the
               Papers of Newton D. Baker, Library of Congress Manuscript
               Division (hereafter, Baker Papers, LOC).

                    ^38 Evidently this plan did not survive.  It is referred
               to in a memorandum of 14 November 1916, _Record of the Joint_
               _Army and Navy Board_, cited in Grenville and Young, _Politics,_
               _Strategy, and American Diplomacy_, 334-35.

                                                                         21

               known, would surely have embarrassed the General Staff,
               which had repeatedly and earnestly denied that any such
               plans were being made to send troops to Europe.  Although
               some in the War College Division probably welcomed the
               rational consideration of American involvement in the war,
               they were compelled to sweep these recommendations under the
               rug.  Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn, then Chief of the
               War College Division, warned Davis:  "Unless you can be
               absolutely certain that there is no risk of such reports
               coming to the attention of outside persons, it would be well
               to refrain from dispatching them."  Although they would
               reemerge after the break in US-German diplomatic relations
               in early February 1917, Davis's plans met with little
               consideration at this time.^39 
                    This lack of American preparation had several causes. 
               The military planners themselves were far from innocent, and
               the anachronistic view of the conjunction between American
               military and foreign policy formed the first hurdle to
               adequeate planning.  To claim that American military
               strategy before 1917 was wholly unrelated to the nation's
               diplomatic goals would be slightly incorrect.  As a matter
               of fact, the nation's various military strategies meshed
               quite well with some foreign policy assumptions and
               objectives.  The problem was that the traditional approach
               to American foreign relations which these military
               strategies best supported -- the Monroe Doctrine -- had
               already been modified with no commensurate change in the
               military policy which backed it up.
                    By restricting the Western Hemisphere to US influence,
               the Monroe Doctrine was doubly limiting; not only did it
               proscribe European nations from involvement in the Americas,
               it also restrained the diplomatic and political objectives
               of the United States to that territory.  American military
               policy through the turn of the century did much to support
               this foreign policy goal.  The American military doctrine
               laid down under Secretary of War Elihu Root was founded on
               the opinion that until the US possessed a navy strong enough
               to be divided between the two oceans, the main portion of
               the fleet would be stationed in the Atlantic and would stand



               _                    _

                    ^39 Memoranda from Davis, 17 November 1916, RG 165/9910-
               1, 18 November 1916, RG 165/9910-2, 27 November 1916, RG
               165/9910-3, and 18 December 1916, RG 165/9910-4, NA.  Kuhn
               to Davis, 5 February 1917, RG 165/9910-6, NA.  See also
               Ronald H. Spector, "'You're Not Going to Send Soldiers Over
               There Are You!':  The American Search for an Alternative to
               the Western Front, 1916-1917," _Military Affairs_ 36 (February
               1972): 1-2.
                                                                         22

               ready to enforce the Monroe Doctrine to prevent the possible
               encroachment of European powers.^40 
                    The easy victories against Spain in Cuba and the
               Philippines in the late nineteenth century lulled Americans
               into a sense of military complacency in which they believed
               they could enjoy all the fruits of world power with no
               commensurate commitment of military strength.  As American
               eyes turned toward more distant foreign policy objectives,
               such as those in the Far East, the American military policy
               remained stagnantly rooted in defense of the North American
               continent.  Consequently, John Hay, the American Secretary
               of State under President Theodore Roosevelt, was impotent to
               check Japanese expansionism in the Far East through his
               diplomatic efforts.  America's military policy, more
               particularly its naval doctrine, allowed for no means of
               projecting her influence that far away from its shores.^41 
                    Neither was the army free from such myopia.  Between
               1911 and the spring of 1917, American military interests
               focused on the conflict with Mexico which resulted in
               invasions by American forces in 1914 and 1916.  Historian
               Edward M. Coffman argues that even though there was no
               formal declaration of war with Mexico, the tension caused by
               these events and the possibility of an escalation of the
               conflict dominated military thinking in this period.  This
               tunnel-visioned concern with exclusive defense of American
               soil precluded any serious consideration of the events in
               Europe even as the President was suggesting through the
               House-Grey Memorandum that the US might fight alongside the
               Allies against Germany.^42 
                    By the time of the First World War, the United States
               clearly had interests that exceeded its geographic
               boundaries.  Military policy, however, had not kept pace
               with diplomatic expansion.  The Naval Act of 1916 had indeed
               _                    _

                    ^40 Grenville and Young, _Politics, Strategy, and American_
               _Diplomacy_, 300-307.  See also Thomas A. Bailey, _A Diplomatic_
               _History of the American People_, 10th ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
               NJ:  Prentice-Hall, 1980 [1940]), 475-76 and 483-84.

                    ^41 Norman A. Graebner, _Foundations of American Foreign_
               _Policy:  A Realist Appraisal from Franklin to McKinley_
               (Wilmington, DE:  Scholarly Resources, 1985), 351-55;
               Grenville and Young, _Politics, Strategy, and American_
               _Diplomacy_, 312-16; Richard W. Turk, "Defending the New
               Empire, 1900-1914," in _In Peace and War:  Interpretations of_
               _American Naval History, 1775-1978_, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan,
               Contributions in Military History 16 (Westport, CT: 
               Greenwood Press, 1978): 193-97.

                    ^42 Coffman, "American Military and Strategic Policy in
               World War I," 70-2.

                                                                         23

               launched a far-reaching buildup of the battle fleet with the
               eventual goal of sixty capital ships by 1925.  To begin
               progress toward this goal it had authorized the expenditure
               of $315 million on ten battleships, six battle cruisers and
               support vessels.  In spite of this expansion, such naval
               policy still created an unbalanced fleet, the very weakness
               that would have prevented adequate defense of the
               Philippines in the event of war with Japan:
                      Construction Authorized by Naval Act of 1916^43 

                                          Number         First Year
                         Ship Type      Authorized     Appropriations
                         ---------      ----------     --------------
                         Battleships        10                4
                         Battle Cruisers     6                4
                         Light Cruisers     10                4
                         Destroyers         50               20
                         Fleet Submarines    9               --
                         Coast Submarines   59               30
                         Fuel Ships          3                1
                         Repair Ships        1               --
                         Transports          1               --
                         Hospital Ships      1                1
                         Destroyer Tenders   1               --
                         Submarine Tenders   1               --
                         Ammunition Ships    2                1
                         Gunboats            2                1

               The US would be at war for more than three and a half months
               before it revised this Naval Act, and even then the
               resultant policy was rather ludicrous.  The government spent
               $25 million on wooden submarine chasers, and although it
               contracted for $250 million worth of destroyers, only forty-
               four were completed during the war; the remaining 223 were
               built after the Armistice.  Likewise, serious policy-making
               and strategic planning for the army would have to wait.^44 
               _                    _

                    ^43 _Navy Yearbook_, 1916, 480-81, cited in Adams, "The
               Influences Affecting Naval Shipbuilding Legislation," 62. 
               See also David F. Trask, "The American Navy in a World at
               War, 1914-1918," in _In Peace and War:  Interpretations of_
               _American Naval History, 1775-1978_, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan,
               Contributions in Military History 16 (Westport, CT: 
               Greenwood Press, 1978):  208-09.

                    ^44 Ferrell, _Woodrow Wilson and World War I_, 47; Paulo E.
               Coletta, "The American Naval Leaders' Preparations for War,"
               in _The Great War, 1914-18:  Essays on the Military,_
               _Political and Social History of the First World War_, ed.
               R.J.Q. Adams (College Station:  Texas A&M University Press,
               1990):  174-75.
                                                                         24

                    Preparedness, of course, had ultimately been completely
               unrelated to realistic military policy.  Support for this
               policy had been wide, but shallow and shortlived.  Most
               proponents -- especially Wilson himself -- had viewed it not
               as a prelude to war, but rather as war's alternative. 
               However strong public and political support might have
               seemed for sound military planning, preparedness did not
               mark a turning point in the American view toward the role
               and nature of the military, and it was inadequate in the
               final reckoning to overcome the major hurdles which stood in
               the way of such a goal.
                    A second hinderance to military planning, the nation's
               prevailing isolationist mood, cannot be discounted.  Many
               segments of American society clearly expressed their desire
               to remain above the fray which had engulfed Europe. 
               Wilson's admonishment to remain neutral in thought as well
               as action was as much a reflection of American opinion as it
               was a guidepost for US policy.  Significant minorities of
               the American public, including the eight million German-
               Americans and four million Irish-Americans, had little
               desire to assist the Entente.  Even though most "old-stock"
               Americans seemed to favor the British and French, they still
               believed that the wisest path for America was neutrality,
               either because they believed that the Allies would win as a
               matter of course, because they believed that the conflict
               involved little direct American interest or because, as was
               the case with many pro-Allied intellectuals, because they
               were idealistic pacifists.  Even Wilson's Anglophile
               ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, wrote on the
               eve of the war, "Again and ever I thank Heaven for the
               Atlantic Ocean."^45 
                    Not only did Americans feel geographically separated
               from the conflict, but they felt morally distant as well. 
               Even some of Wilson's political rivals initially supported
               the desire for neutrality, with notable exceptions including
               Theodore Roosevelt and Augustus Peabody Gardner, the
               Massachusetts Republican who warned in October 1914 that
               "bullets cannot be stopped by bombast nor powder vanquished
               by platitudes."  Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette's
               commitment to American non-intervention would outlast even
               Wilson's, and former President William Howard Taft wrote:
                           [The war] is a cataclysm.  It is a retrograde
                         step in Christian civilization. . . .  All Europe
                         is to be a battlefield. . . .
               _                    _

                    ^45 Page to Wilson, 29 July 1914, _PWW_, 30:314-16; Daniel
               M. Smith, _The Great Departure:  The United States in World_
               _War I, 1914-1920_ (New York:  John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 2-
               3; Arthur S. Link, _Wilson_, vol 3:  _The Struggle for_
               _Neutrality, 1914-1915_ (Princeton:  Princeton University
               Press, 1960), 18-19.
                                                                         25

                           While we can be sure that such a war as this,
                         taking it by and large, will be a burden upon the
                         United States and is a great misfortune, looked at
                         solely from the standpoint of the United States,
                         we have every reason to be happy that we are able
                         to preserve strict neutrality in respect to
                         it.^46 

                    Women activists in America also staunchly opposed US
               involvement.  Within days of the outbreak of the war in
               1914, women in New York began planning a peace parade for 29
               August to protest the horrors of warfare.  Decrying war's
               destructive effects on the protection, nurture, fulfillment,
               conservation, and ascent of human life, prominent social
               worker Jane Addams helped to form the Women's Peace Party,
               hoping that if "women in Europe -- in the very countries
               which are now at war -- receive a message from the women of
               America solemnly protesting against this sacrifice, they may
               take courage to formulate their own."  Addams even persuaded
               the American business leader Henry Ford to finance an
               attempt to initiate a peace settlement, and on 4 December he
               sailed from Hoboken, New Jersey, in his chartered "peace
               ship," the _Oscar II_ of the Scandinavian-American Line.  In
               such a strong and homogenous climate of opinion, active
               military planning appeared at once useless, absurd and even
               dangerous, and therefore was to be avoided.^47 
                    The civilian-military relationship that existed before
               1917 formed the third of the obstacles to a coordinated and
               realistic approach to military planning in the period before
               1917.  While the President clearly could have formed no
               military policy without the consent of Congress, and while
               the legislators had proven reluctant to fight the inertia of
               _                    _

                    ^46 _New York Times_, 16 October 1914; John M. Cooper, Jr.,
               _The Vanity of Power:  American Isolation and the First World_
               _War, 1914-1917_ (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1969), 19-
               32; Cooper, "World War I:  European Origins and American
               Intervention," 7-8; William Howard Taft, "A Message to the
               People of the United States," _Independent_ 79 ( 10 August
               1914):  198-99.

                    ^47 Jane Addams, "What War is Destroying," _Advocate of_
               _Peace_ 77 (1915):  64-5.  See also Barbara J. Steinson,
               _American Women's Activism in World War I_, The Modern
               American History Series, ed. Frank Freidel (New York: 
               Garland Publishing, 1982), 1-47; and Steinson, "'The Mother
               Half of Humanity':  American Women in the Peace and
               Preparedness Movements in World War I," in _Women, War, and_
               _Revolution_, ed. Carol R. Berkin and Clara M. Lovett (New
               York:  Holmes and Meier, 1980):  259-84; Millis, _Road to_
               _War_, 242-45.
                                                                         26

               domestically focused planning, Wilson himself showed no
               inclination that he desired a significantly broader or more
               cohesive approach to policy-making than the lawmakers were
               willing to give.  The President and some others in the
               Administration viewed the military as having little if any
               role in the formation of domestic policy.  When tensions
               between America and Japan mounted in April and May 1913
               following the California legislature's adoption of a measure
               prohibiting Japanese land ownership in that state, fears
               mounted among navy leaders that Japan might attempt an
               attack on the Philippines.  The Joint Board of the Army and
               Navy recommended the dispatch of three American warships to
               defend those islands, but the President refused and ordered
               the Joint Board to hold no further meetings until ordered to
               do so.  Wilson's first Secretary of State, William Jennings
               Bryan, was led by this incident to remark, "[military
               officers] could not be trusted to say what we should or
               should not do, till we actually got into war."^48 
                    Wilson himself staunchly defended the constitutional
               dictate of civilian command over the military.  He was
               appalled in the summer of 1918 when he received an
               unsolicited etching that portrayed him in military uniform. 
               He replied to the artist that:
                         Putting me in uniform violates a very fundamental
                         principle of our institutions, namely, that the
                         military power is subordinate to the civil. . . . 
                         The armed forces of the country must be the
                         instruments of the authority by which policy [is]
                         determined. . . .  I do not think this is a mere
                         formal scruple on my part.  I believe that it goes
                         to the root of things.^49 

               Such an atmosphere proved harsh to any approaches to
               military policy, even in the most theoretical form, which
               exceeded Wilson's narrowly dictated restrictions.
               _                    _

                    ^48 Bryan quoted in Ernest R. May, "The Development of
               Political-Military Consultation in the United States,"
               _Political Science Quarterly_ 70 (June 1955):  166; Link,
               _Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917_, 86-7. 
               Members of the Joint Board seem to have taken the
               Presidential admonishment to heart, since Henry
               Breckinridge, Assistant Secretary of War from 1913 to 1916,
               recalled it in a 1958 interview as "a board I fooled with on
               hot summer afternoons when there was nothing else to do,"
               quoted in Edward M. Coffman, "American Military and
               Strategic Policy in World War I," 68-70.

                    ^49 Wilson to Bernhardt Wall, 8 July 1918, _PWW_, 48:557. 
               The etching was sent to Wilson on 17 June 1918 and is shown
               in the illustration section of ibid., 48:358-59.
                                                                         27

                    In retrospect, then, sound, American military policy-
               making, despite the hoopla surrounding the preparedness
               campaign, seemed doomed from the beginning.  The military
               planners were hardly inclined to pursue a policy suited to
               the realities of America's relationship with the European
               war, even had they operated under free reign.  Such
               uninhibited planning, however, was impossible in the context
               of American isolationism and in light of Wilson's personal
               attitudes toward the military, especially during the
               election campaign in 1916.  The German military leaders
               correctly assessed the condition of America's military at
               the end of 1916; even after wrangling with neutral rights
               and submarine warfare and after trumpeting the bugle of
               preparedness, the nation had no means at that time to wage
               war in Europe.  Ironically, it was Germany's own decision
               which would spark change in American military planning. 
               Fearing nothing from Wilson and the United States, the
               Germans themselves chose war.  There seemed little
               indication that the US would have radically altered its
               military policy in the near future had events proceeded as
               they appeared at the close of 1916.  The German resumption
               of submarine warfare, however, guaranteed that it would.