I

                           CAST OF CHARACTERS:  BIRTH OF THE US

                         WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, 1898 - 1916


                    Although the General Staff would bear the
               responsibility for moving the nation to a war footing once
               the US had entered the fray, it was embarrassingly weak at
               the time of the American declaration of war.  The
               intersection of several sentiments, ranging from honest fear
               of militarism to political infighting within the War
               Department, had conspired to thwart the creation of a modern
               and centralized coordinating and planning agency.  The
               General Staff that existed on paper was woefully inadequate;
               the one that existed in Washington was a mere shadow of
               that.
                    The General Staff had faced an uphill battle since its
               inception around the turn of the century.  The division of
               authority that existed at that time between the Secretary of
               War and the Commanding General of the Army hindered the
               efficient administration of the US military.  The Secretary
               controlled the financial affairs of the army and supervised
               the various bureaus, such as the Adjutant General, the
               Ordnance Department, the Quartermaster General and others. 
               The Commanding General, on the other hand, was charged with
               purely line matters including the discipline and efficiency
               of the troops.  No one had specific responsibility for
               mobilization planning.  The Secretary of War was often too
               busy and, with little military experience, inadequately
               trained to deal with the technical aspects of military
               policy.  In addition, turnover was often too great in the
               various bureaus to facilitate cogent planning, and the
               Commanding General suffered from a lack of personnel to
               concentrate on the task.^1 
               _                    _

                    ^1 Kreidberg and Henry, _History of Military Mobilization_,
               175; William R. Roberts, "Loyalty and Expertise:  The
               Transformation of the Nineteenth-Century American General
               Staff and the Creation of the Modern Military Establishment"
               (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1979), 210. 
               Roberts points out that during the two-and-a-half years
               prior to the Spanish-American War, the army appointed four
               quartermasters general and six commissaries general.

                                             1
                                                                          2

                    The Spanish-American War demonstrated the glaring
               weaknesses in the organization of the War Department.  The
               beginning of that conflict found the US not only lacking a
               definite plan of campaign, but even missing accurate maps of
               enemy territory and reliable information about the military
               resources necessary to devise such a strategy.  Instead of
               determining the requisite size and composition of an
               expeditionary force to meet its predetermined mission, the
               actual approach of the strategic planners was to see how
               many troops, ships and supplies could be gathered in Florida
               and from there decide what to do with them.^2 
                    Soldiers initially sent to Cuba were clad in winter
               woolen uniforms ill-suited to the tropical climate.  General
               Nelson A. Miles, Commander of the United States Army,
               reported on 4 June 1898 that over 300 railroad cars loaded
               with war materials were sitting idly along the roads around
               Tampa, Florida.  The invoices and bills of lading for these
               shipments had not been received, forcing officers to break
               open seals and hunt from car to car to determine their
               contents.  The day after he was sworn in as lieutenant
               colonel of the volunteer cavalry, Theodore Roosevelt
               observed, "The delays and stupidity of . . . the Ordnance
               Department surpass belief.  The Quartermaster Department is
               better but bad.  The Commissary Department is good.  There
               is no head, no management whatever in the War Department. 
               Against a good nation we should be helpless."^3 
                    Although the rapid collapse of the Spanish defenses
               failed to provide a severe test for the army, some reform-
               minded military leaders recognized the need for change in
               the structure of the War Department.  Had the United States
               fought a sturdier foe at the turn of the century, the
               weaknesses in high level military organization might have
               proven disastrous.  At the close of the war, President
               William McKinley appointed Grenville M. Dodge, a Civil War
               veteran and railroad promoter, to conduct an investigation
               into the War Department's failures during the war.  The
               Dodge Commission provided an eight-volume critique of the
               status of the military, concluding that "no well regulated .
               . . corporation could transact business satisfactorily"
               under the existing conditions.  The recommendations of this
               review board, however, were hardly radical in scope.  One of
               _                    _

                    ^2 Major General Otto L. Nelson, Jr., _National Security_
               _and the General Staff_ (Washington:  Infantry Journal Press,
               1946), 28-34.

                    ^3 _Correspondence, Relating to the War with Spain, April_
               _15 to September 1, 1898_ (Washington:  U.S. Adjutant
               General's Office, 1902), 4, cited in ibid., 28; Walter
               Millis, _The Martial Spirit_ (New York:  Houghton Mifflin,
               1931), 217.
                                                                          3

               the strongest proposals suggested that the current
               responsibilities of the Quartermaster Corps should be
               divided, but the Commission could not decide on the proper
               manner of doing so.  In retrospect it is clear that true,
               fundamental reform would have to await the appointment of a
               new Secretary of War.^4 
                    When the continued criticism of the War Department
               forced the resignation of Secretary of War R.A. Alger, the
               problems arising out of the occupation of Cuba, Puerto Rico
               and the Philippines motivated McKinley's choice of a
               successor.  His selection, Elihu Root, later described the
               telephone call that he received from a member of President
               McKinley's staff:
                         I answered, 'Thank the President for me but say
                         that it is quite absurd, I know nothing about war,
                         I know nothing about the Army.'  There came back
                         the reply, 'President Mckinley directs me to say
                         that he is not looking for anyone who knows
                         anything about the Army; he has got to have a
                         lawyer to direct the government of these Spanish
                         islands, and you are the lawyer he wants.'^5 

               Ironically, this lawyer who knew nothing about the army
               would provide the spark that resulted in the formation of
               the War Department General Staff.
                    The reforms instituted after the Spanish-American War
               were shaped as much by the political climate of the War
               Department as they were by Root's own vision.  The heads of
               the bureaus enjoyed a great deal of sovereignty within their
               domains of responsibility and fought any changes that
               threatened to undermine their influence.  Nonetheless, Root
               sought to create a coordinating body to solve some of the
               deficiencies made obvious by the "splendid little war."  His
               analysis had revealed several deficiencies in army
               organization, including a lack of connection between the
               staff bureaus and the army, the absence of any central
               agency for the formation of a general military policy and a
               lack of coordination among the various bureaus.^6 

               _                    _

                    ^4 _Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to_
               _Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War_
               _with Spain_, by Grenville M. Dodge (Washington:  Government
               Printing Office, 1899), 44; Hewes, "The United States Army
               General Staff," 62.

                    ^5 Elihu Root, _Addresses on Government and Citizenship_
               (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1916), 503-04.

                    ^6 John Dickinson, _The Building of an Army_ (New York:  D.
               Appleton-Century Co., 1922), 255.
                                                                          4

                    Realizing that a radical reconstruction of the War
               Department would meet fierce opposition from its various
               divisions, Root decided that as a first step he would create
               a War College with as many powers of a General Staff as was
               practical.  In February 1900 he appointed a board of
               officers to consider this proposal under the direction of
               General William Ludlow.  On 31 October 1900 this panel
               recommended the creation of a War College to digest and
               disseminate military data and information, develop means of
               military education and training, further the higher
               instruction of the army and serve as an agency at the
               disposal of the War Department for the coordination of
               military administration.^7 
                    The proposal of the Ludlow Board met with anticipated
               opposition.  Many people outside of the military feared that
               a General Staff smacked of Prussian militarism and therefore
               was antithetical to the American tradition of a soldiery
               under civilian control.  Within the military, opposition was
               often more self-interested.  General Miles, still the
               Commanding General of the army, vehemently resisted these
               suggestions, believing that a General Staff would threaten
               the initiative of his command.  In addition, the bureau
               chiefs opposed the panel's conclusion, correctly viewing it
               as a challenge to their independence.  Root, with much
               justification, believed that these chiefs' permanent tenure
               in Washington had created a chasm between their concerns and
               those of the rest of the US Army.  In Root's own words, the
               heads of the bureaus "had become entrenched in Washington
               armchairs."^8 
                    The Act of 2 February 1901 included Root's recommended
               War College.  The Secretary of War also succeeded in a
               brilliant and subtle -- but in the end fruitless -- plan to
               defuse future antagonism to his reforms.  Knowing that he
               would never gain the support of the current bureau chiefs,
               and knowing too that any future heads of these departments
               would be equally obstinate because of their permanent tenure
               of office, he substituted a four-year detail for the
               previously fixed appointments.  He successfully implemented
               this change because he did nothing to affect the current
               holders of these positions.  Root thus attempted to secure a
               tighter degree of control over the War Department bureaus
               for any future battles.^9 
               _                    _

                    ^7 Nelson, _National Security and the General Staff_, 46-7.

                    ^8 Philip C. Jessup, _Elihu Root_, 2 vols. (New York: 
               Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1938), 1:244; John L. Sutton, "The
               German General Staff in US Defense Policy," _Military Affairs_
               25 (Winter 1961-62):  197.

                    ^9 Nelson, _National Security and the General Staff_, 48.
                                                                          5

                    Buoyed by his success with the 1901 Act, Root decided
               to seek the establishment of a complete General Staff.  In
               early 1902, the Secretary of War submitted a measure that
               was to become House Resolution 11350 of the 57th Congress. 
               Sections four through ten of this proposition created a
               General Staff charged with the consideration of military
               policy and the formation of comprehensive plans for national
               defense.  In addition, this proposal created a Chief of
               Staff who would, under the direct authority of the President
               and the Secretary of War, supervise both the General Staff
               and the army as a whole.  General Miles led the opposition
               in the difficult legislative battle, again fearing that a
               General Staff would rob the Commanding General of his
               independence.  Root's proposal faced opposition among some
               legislators as well.  During his questioning of the
               Secretary of War, Senator Joseph Hawley of Connecticut
               claimed that "Washington and Napoleon had no need for
               strategy boards," to which Root responded, "Well, they are
               dead; dead as our present system."^10   In spite of those
               who wished to block the reforms, Congress enacted the bill
               on 14 February 1903.^11 
                    The Act had its weaknesses, however.  The Inspector
               General's Office remained a separate bureau, and without the
               power of inspection, the General Staff's supervisory
               authority was relatively meaningless.  In addition, minor
               modifications of the law opened the possibility that any
               individual bureau chief with sufficient legislative
               influence could exempt himself from the bill's restrictions. 
               Nevertheless, a coordinating and planning agency for the War
               Department now existed.^12 
                    Under the Act of 14 February 1903 and subsequent army
               regulations, the General Staff consisted of a Chief of Staff
               (Lieutenant General Samuel B.M. Young), two other general
               officers and forty-two junior officers.  The Staff itself
               included three divisions.  The First Division, led by
               Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, dealt with administrative matters. 
               The Second Division, under the direction of Major W.D.
               _                    _

                    ^10 US Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs,
               _Efficiency of the Army_, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902,
               13, 17-18.

                    ^11 James W. Pohl, "The General Staff and American
               Defense Policy:  The Formative Period, 1898-1917" (Ph.D.
               dissertation, University of Texas, 1967), 62-93; Roberts,
               "Loyalty and Expertise," 247-50.  Roberts emphasizes the
               significance of the word "supervise" rather than "command"
               in regards to the chief of staff's duties as being
               fundamental to the ultimate passage of the legislation.

                    ^12 Ibid.
                                                                          6

               Beach, oversaw military information and attaches.  The Third
               Division, headed by Colonel A. MacKenzie, directed military
               planning and training.  The predecessor of the General
               Staff, the Army War College, assisted the General Staff and
               its Chief in the preparation of plans for national
               defense.^13 
                    The Act of 1903 had established the framework for the
               General Staff, but it failed to guarantee its effectiveness. 
               The traditional opposition continued, and the Act of 25 June
               1906 exempted the Ordnance Department from the provisions of
               the four-year detail system, thus marking the beginning of
               the return to permanent tenure for the bureau chiefs.  The
               small General Staff continued to drown in a sea of
               administrative matters and had little time to formulate
               plans during its early years.  The scant planning that did
               occur was based on data from past wars; the US invasion of
               Cuba in 1906, therefore, suffered few of the problems of the
               Spanish-American War.  Such an approach, however, lacked the
               foresight necessary for modern warfare.^14 
                    When Major General Leonard Wood became Chief of Staff
               on 22 April 1910, he was appalled by the mass of
               inconsequential matter occupying the General Staff's
               attention.  Out of one hundred random studies, he found not
               a single one that bore any relation to war and only three
               that were of any consequence.  One paper in particular
               illustrated the absurdity of some of the matters occupying
               the General Staff's time.  After laying out seven pages of
               arguments, pro and con, it concluded that "it is therefore
               recommended that no toilet paper be issued."  This paper was
               signed by the Chief of Staff and bore the approval of Robert
               Shaw Oliver, then Acting Secretary of War.   These
               weaknesses indicted both the individual staff members and
               the fragmented structure of the General Staff itself.  Wood
               reorganized the General Staff into three divisions:  the
               Mobile Army, the Coast Artillery, and the War College
               Division, which combined the General Staff planners and the
               Army War College into one unit.  This reorganization
               emphasized the General Staff's role as a coordinating agency
               and resulted in more integrated army planning and an end to
               the previous compilation of disparate studies.^15   In spite
               _                    _

                    ^13 Nelson, _National Security and the General Staff_, 60-
               71.

                    ^14 Pohl, "The General Staff and American Defense
               Policy," 93-4.

                    ^15 Johnson Hagood, _The Services of Supply:  A Memoir of_
               _the Great War_ (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1927), 21;
               Kreidberg and Henry, _History of Military Mobilization in the_
                                                             (continued...)
                                                                          7

               of these attempts, the inertia of inaction continued to
               hinder the General Staff's effectiveness.  One Field
               Artillery Major who served on the General Staff during this
               time noted:
                         Most of the General Staff officers were then of
                         the type whose conception of their job was to get
                         to their desks at 9 A.M., pass papers from the
                         "In" basket to the "Out" basket, read the _Army and_
                         _Navy Journal_, and gossip about army politics. 
                         Their tendency was to concern themselves too much
                         with administrative matters and too little with
                         high planning and original thinking.^16 

                    Wood's reforms did not fail to step on some toes within
               the existing bureau structure.  As part of his attempts to
               promote greater efficiency in governmental operations,
               President William Howard Taft created the War Department
               Board on Business Methods in March 1911.  Major General Fred
               C. Ainsworth, Adjutant General, chaired the board.  Under
               the direction of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Wood and
               the General Staff presented proposals for the board's
               consideration, including one suggestion for a change in
               paperwork methods within the Adjutant General's own
               office.^17 
                    The perceived audacity of the General Staff infuriated
               Ainsworth, who on 3 February 1912 sent a biting reply
               denigrating the experience and competence of its members:
                           It is understood, perhaps incorrectly, that the
                         plan now under consideration, was formulated by
                         two relatively young officers, neither of whom has
                         any practical knowledge of the purposes for which
                         [this paperwork is] used in the War Department. .
                         . .
                           Neither of these officers, nor any other officer
                         in or out of the General Staff, no matter how long
                         he may have been in service, is qualified to
               _                    _

                    ^15 (...continued)
               _U.S. Army_, 179-82; Hewes, "The United States Army General
               Staff, 1900-1917," 69-70.

                    ^16 William Lassiter, "Memoir," US Military Academy
               Library, West Point, New York, quoted in Edward M. Coffman,
               "The American Military and Strategic Policy in World War I,"
               in _War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War, 1914-_
               _1918_, ed. Barry Hart and Adrian Preston (London:  Croom
               Helm, 1977), 67.  Lassiter went on to become a major general
               and the chief of corps artillery during the war.

                    ^17 Nelson, _National Security and the General Staff_, 151-
               57.
                                                                          8

                         prepare forms of any kind for use in the Adjutant
                         General's Office, unless, through actual service
                         in that office, he has acquired a practical
                         knowledge of the manner in which and the purpose
                         for which the information recorded on these forms
                         is used.

               Echoing the long-standing opposition of those within the
               traditional structure of the army, Ainsworth argued that "it
               is most inadvisable ever to intrust to incompetent amateurs
               the management of business that is of nation-wide
               importance, and that can only be managed prudently, safely,
               and efficiently by those whom long service has made experts
               with regard to it."  In an _ad hominem_ attack on Wood and by
               implication on the Secretary of War himself, Ainsworth added
               that if his objections to the General Staff proposal which
               "have been pointed out here are not sufficient to carry to
               the minds of those with whom the decision of this matter now
               rests . . . then it will be worse than useless to present
               further facts or arguments. . . ."^18 
                    Wood carried Ainsworth's reply to Stimson and President
               Taft.  Stimson reprimanded the Adjutant General on 14
               February.  He enumerated several similar instances of
               defiance and concluded:
                         Your present action . . . is therefore but the
                         culmination of a series of outbreaks evidencing
                         such intolerance of subordination and such
                         readiness to impugn either the motives or the
                         intelligence of those with whom it is your duty to
                         work in association as, if uncorrected, to destroy
                         your usefulness in your present office.  It is
                         impossible that the business of the Government
                         shall be properly conducted if official
                         communications are made the occasion for
                         contemptuous comments and aspersions upon fellow
                         officers and for insolence to superiors.^19 

               The President ordered Ainsworth to step down from his duties
               pending consideration of disciplinary actions.  On the next
               day Taft granted the Adjutant General's request to be
               allowed to retire from the army.^20 

               _                    _

                    ^18 Ainsworth to Wood, 3 February 1912, in US Congress,
               House, Report Number 508, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1912,
               6-13.

                    ^19 Stimson to Ainsworth, 14 February 1912, ibid.

                    ^20 Hermann Hagedorn, _Leonard Wood:  A Biography_, 2 vols.
               (New York:  Harper and Brothers, 1931), 2:112.
                                                                          9

                    Thus by early 1912 one of the staunchest opponents of
               the General Staff had retired under threat of court-martial. 
               Many of the other, older and more conservative elements had
               also been removed, and the Chief of Staff was now the
               recognized head of the army.  Nonetheless, the General Staff
               itself had not yet reached maturity, and during the first
               part of the year the War Department remained preoccupied
               with trivial matters.  A Leavenworth graduate sorrowfully
               noted that he found the cavalry officers in the War
               Department at this time concerned with a new style of saber
               while their infantry counterparts debated the color of the
               stripe on the dress-blue trouser.^21 
                    The General Staff's attempts at a comprehensive
               American military policy came to fruition in 1912 with
               Secretary of War Stimson's report, "The Organization of the
               Land Forces of the United States."  This plan recommended
               that the United States organize its land forces into three
               distinct groups:  a regular army organized in divisions and
               cavalry brigades ready for immediate use as an expeditionary
               force, an army of national citizen soldiers which would fill
               out the ranks of the regular army, and an army of volunteers
               to be organized if greater forces were needed.^22   Woodrow
               Wilson's election in 1912, however, resulted in the shelving
               of the Stimson Plan.  Unable to secure its comprehensive
               military policy, the General Staff was relegated again to a
               piecemeal approach to strategic planning.
                    Respect continued to wane for the General Staff.  An
               investigation of Ainsworth's reprimand led by his supporters
               on the House Military Affairs Committee concluded that the
               General "had been guilty of no act which justified the
               letter of the Secretary of War and the action which resulted
               in the country's loss of his activities when they were most
               needed."  Motivated in great part to avenge Ainsworth's
               treatment, Congress had by 1913 reduced the General Staff's
               number from forty-five to thirty-six.^23 
                    The beginning of the First World War in 1914 brought
               with it President Wilson's strong admonishment for
               _                    _

                    ^21 Nelson, _National Security and the General Staff_, 151-
               66; Kreidberg and Henry, _History of Military Mobilization_,
               182; Hewes, "The United States Army General Staff," 68-9;
               Coffman, _The War to End All Wars_, 12-13.

                    ^22 "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United
               States," in "Report of the Secretary of War," in _War_
               _Department Annual Reports, 1912_, 4 vols. (Washington: 
               Government Printing Office, 1913), 1:69-128.

                    ^23 "Report Number 508," 2; "Report of the Chief of
               Staff," in _War Department Annual Reports, 1912_, 1:242-43; 
               Pohl, "The General Staff and American Defense Policy," 355.
                                                                         10

               neutrality.  Military policy-making was anathema.  The
               European conflict did, however, slowly reveal to some the
               inadequacy of the American military.  In response to a
               request from Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, the
               General Staff devoted a large part of 1915 to the 
               preparation of the "Statement of a Proper Military Policy
               for the United States," which recommended increasing the
               size of the regular army from 100,000 to 230,000, continuing
               support for the organized militia and establishing a reserve
               of trained citizens, officers and supplies.  Garrison
               adopted much of the "Statement" in his Continental Army
               Plan, which sought to establish a standing army of 140,000
               (well below the General Staff recommendation in the
               "Statement," but the maximum amount which current military
               housing could accommodate) and a national, volunteer reserve
               force of 400,000 men ready for instant call.^24 
                    Garrison's Continental Army idea suffered opposition
               both from those who thought it went too far and from those
               who thought it was insufficient.  Faced with stiff
               opposition from his own party, Wilson withdrew his support,
               and on 10 February 1916 Secretary Garrison and Assistant
               Secretary Henry Breckinridge resigned in protest, throwing
               the already fickle support for military planning and
               preparedness into further confusion.^25 
                    In the absence of Executive initiative and in the face
               of the shortcomings revealed by intervention in Mexico,
               Congress seized the reigns of leadership in 1916.  After
               extensive hearings, the National Defense Act of 1916 finally
               became law on 3 June.  Based in part on the 1915 "Statement"
               and supplementary documents, the National Defense Act seemed
               on the surface to vindicate the General Staff.  According to
               the Act, the army would consist of the regular army, the
               volunteer army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted
               Reserve Corps, the National Guard and any other forces that
               might be authorized by law.  Finally, the General Staff's
               work and planning seemed to be recognized for its merits.^26 
               _                    _

                    ^24 "The Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the
               United States," in "Report of the Secretary of War," in _War_
               _Department Annual Reports, 1915_, 3 vols. (Washington: 
               Government Printing Office, 1916), 1:113-35.

                    ^25 Garrison to Wilson, 9 February 1916, _PWW_, 36:143-44;
               Wilson to Garrison, ibid., 36:162-64.  See Chapter 2 of this
               thesis for a more detailed discussion of the fate of the
               Continental Army Reserve Plan.

                    ^26 Kreidberg and Henry, _History of Military_
               _Mobilization_, 192-95; Nelson, _National Security and the_
               _General Staff_, 180-84.  For a detailed discussion of the
                                                             (continued...)
                                                                         11

                    Provisions deeper within the National Defense Act,
               however, boded ill for the General Staff.  The law limited
               it to fifty-five officers, including a Chief of Staff, two
               general officers, ten colonels, ten lieutenant colonels,
               fifteen majors and seventeen captains, with the added
               restriction that no more than half of the junior officers
               could be on duty in or around Washington, DC.  The statute
               abolished the Mobile Army and Coastal Artillery Divisions
               within the General Staff, and limited the jurisdiction of
               the organization to non-administrative matters, calling into
               question whether it still had supervisory control over the
               bureaus.  Although Congress had adopted many of the General
               Staff's recommendations and had once again codified the
               concept of a central, coordinating agency, the limitations
               caused the General Staff to come dangerously close to
               withering away in 1916.  Only the fortuitous combination of
               the perception that the United States was rapidly drifting
               into the European conflict and the arrival of a new
               Secretary of War saved it.^27 
                    If anyone in 1916 was a less likely candidate for the
               position of Secretary of War than Elihu Root had been at the
               turn of the century, it was Newton D. Baker.  Apart from a
               short stint as private secretary to the Postmaster General
               and two terms as mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, Baker had little
               administrative experience.  Perhaps more worrisome to those
               who favored expanded military planning, the Martinsburg,
               West Virginia, native was an avowed pacifist, holding
               membership in three pacifist societies.  It was precisely
               for this reason that Wilson dubbed him as the new Secretary
               of War; the President desired an administrator who could
               ameliorate the army's demands for military expansion.  A _New_
               _York Times_ article astutely observed that Wilson sought a
               "sympathetic and useful co-adjuter . . . in this time of
               trial."  Baker himself viewed the appointment as temporary,
               agreeing to serve only until the preparedness controversy
               could be resolved.  Nonetheless, Baker proved as strong a
               supporter of the General Staff idea as had Elihu Root at the
               turn of the century.^28 
               _                    _

                    ^26 (...continued)
               legislative history of the National Defense Act of 1916, see
               John Patrick Finnegan, _Against the Specter of a Dragon:  The_
               _Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917_,
               Contributions in Military History 7 (Westport, CT: 
               Greenwood Press, 1974), 139-57.

                    ^27 Finnegan, _Against the Specter of a Dragon_, 139-57.

                    ^28 _New York Times_, 7 March 1916; Daniel R. Beaver,
               _Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919_
               (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 1-21.
                                                                         12

                    Baker sought to settle the question of the General
               Staff's relationship with the various bureaus.  Judge
               Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder had counseled the new
               Secretary of War to make a narrow reading of the National
               Defense Act, thereby limiting the role of the General Staff. 
               He argued that:
                         duties performed by the General Staff of whatever
                         nature must be general in character.  So the
                         statute expressly provides.  If the matter be of
                         special rather than of general interest and
                         concern; if it be limited rather than general in
                         its effect; if it be a matter falling within and
                         confined to the special jurisdiction of a bureau
                         and not reaching directly other bureaus or the
                         Army as a whole; if it be routine rather than of
                         far-reaching consequence and importance; if it
                         deal with details and specifics rather than
                         generalities, with particular performance rather
                         than general policy, then it is entirely clear
                         that it is not a subject for General Staff
                         consideration and functions.

               As for the duties of the Chief of Staff, Crowder concluded
               that "I do not believe that by virtue of any authority he
               has, either in his capacity as a member of the General Staff
               Corps or as chief of said corps, he can lawfully exercise
               his power so as to stand between a bureau head and the
               Secretary of War."^29 
                    Chief of Staff Hugh L. Scott viewed Crowder's opinion
               with much skepticism and concern.  Vowing to "fight this
               till the end," he sent his own brief to Baker, adding, "Mr.
               Secretary:  I am handing you a case that will be the most
               important decision that you will ever have to make in that
               chair.  Your verdict may spell victory or defeat for our
               armies."^30 
                    On 13 September 1916 Baker rendered his decision. 
               Basing his conclusion on an interpretation of the intent
               behind both Elihu Root's reforms and the resultant Act of
               1903, Baker ruled that:
                         The Chief of Staff, speaking in the name of the
                         Secretary of War, will coordinate and supervise
                         the various bureaus, offices, and departments of
               _                    _

                    ^29 Crowder to Scott, 24 July 1916, in "Report of the
               Secretary of War," in _War Department Annual Reports, 1916_
               (Washington:  Government Printing Office, 1917), 80-9.

                    ^30 Scott to Frederick Palmer, quoted in Palmer, _Newton_
               _D. Baker:  America at War_, 2 vols. (New York:  Dodd & Mead,
               1931), 1:65; Hugh L. Scott, _Some Memoirs of a Soldier_ (New
               York:  D. Appleton-Century Company, 1928), 546-47.
                                                                         13

                         the War Department; he will advise the Secretary
                         of War; he will inform himself in as great detail
                         as in his judgment seems necessary to qualify him
                         adequately to advise the Secretary of War.

               The Secretary of War found in the National Defense Act of
               1916 a reiteration of the intentions of Congress in the Act
               of 1903 -- namely, that the duties of the General Staff,
               while not including daily administrative or executive powers
               within each individual bureau, clearly gave that body a
               supervisory role.  Thus, less than seven months before the
               US declaration of war, a clear-cut decision on the General
               Staff's powers was finally issued.  Even after this ruling,
               however, the Secretary of War usually dealt with the various
               bureau chiefs directly.  Therefore, in spite of this belated
               recognition, and although it would be charged with
               formulating American strategy, the General Staff was still
               unprepared for the demands of the coming war.^31 



























               _                    _

                    ^31 "Decision of the Secretary of War on the Effect of
               Section 5 of the National Defense Act," in "Report of the
               Secretary of War," in _War Department Annual Reports, 1916_,
               70-80; Nelson, _National Security and the General Staff_, 198-
               223.